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ABSTRACT

In recent years, scientists and researchers have devoted considerable
resources to developing medical artificial intelligence (AI) technologies.
Many of these technologies-particularly those that resemble traditional
medical devices in their functions-have received substantial attention in
the legal and policy literature. But other types ofnovel AI technologies, such
as those related to quality improvement and optimizing use of scarce
facilities, have been largely absent from the discussion thus far. These AI
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innovations have the potential to shed light on important aspects of health
innovation policy. First, these AI innovations interact less with the legal
regimes that scholars traditionally conceive of as shaping medical
innovation: patent law, FDA regulation, and health insurance
reimbursement. Second, and perhaps related, a different set of innovation
stakeholders, including health systems and insurers, are conducting their
own research and development in these areas for their own use without
waiting for commercial product developers to innovate for them. The
activities of these innovators have implications for health innovation policy
and scholarship. Perhaps most notably, data possession and control play a
larger role in determining capacity to innovate in this space, while the
ability to satisfy the quality standards of regulators and payers plays a
smaller role relative to more familiar biomedical innovations such as new
drngs and devices.
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INTRODUCTION

Innovation in medical AI is exploding. Every week sees new research
papers presenting new algorithms, new companies launching new products,
and new possibilities for change. AI products promise to recognize and
diagnose skin cancer, to identify eye disease, to find kidney stones, to locate
brain hemorrhages, and to quickly detect COVID-19, among many other
possibilities. 2 These technologies are likely to change the practice of
medicine by increasing the capabilities of care providers in many areas.
Products like these also fit-if somewhat uncomfortably 3-into a capacious
understanding of what new medical technology looks like and how we
2.
AI Central, AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY DATA SCI. INST., https://www.acrdsi.org/DSIServices/FDA-Cleared-AI-Algorithms (https://perma.cc/NJM5-ZX9A]; Andrew A.S. Soltan et al.,

Rapid Triage for COVID-19 Using Routine Clinical Data for Patients Attending Hospital: Development
and Prospective Validation of an Artificial Intelligence Screening Test, 3 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH E78
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/joumals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(20)30274-0/fulltext
[https://perma.cc/42EK-GAEC].
3.
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, I I 6 MICH. L. REV. 421
(2017).
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expect it to be regulated. But these are not the only AI products with the
potential to transform medicine.
Other AI innovations look quite unlike typical medical devices, yet they
also have the potential to transform health care in different ways. 4 A
seemingly mundane example is AI-powered scheduling software, which
predicts the ebb and flow of patients within the health care system and
allocates staff to most effectively meet those patients' needs. Such products
do not directly diagnose or treat patients, but they could increase the
capacity of a stretched system and thereby save lives. Other products
improve quality of care by predicting the likelihood that a patient will be
readmitted to the hospital within a month (so that health care providers can
work with patients to prevent that undesirable outcome) or by identifying
the risk of a patient developing sepsis (so that rapid-response teams can
intervene early). These functions are extremely valuable to the health care
system, and all are amenable to AI assistance.
For these forms of AI innovation, however, the traditional policy levers
that shape much biomedical innovation-patents, FDA regulation, and
insurance reimbursement'-play more uncertain and attenuated roles.
Although many innovators are actively pursuing patents, the patentability
of medical AI under U.S. law is unclear, making it risky to enforce AI
patents that a court might hold invalid. Patents may also be less important
to would-be innovators because AI innovations are often easy to protect via
trade secrecy. Some of these technologies may get less scrutiny from FDA,
perhaps because they do not fit within the statutory definition of medical
devices, or perhaps because they fall within categories for which FDA has
traditionally exercised discretion not to enforce its authorities. And
insurance reimbursement, which normally helps both to drive the
development of medical technology and to provide some quality-related
oversight, plays little role here, as these products are typically not directly
reimbursable. The usual incentives of insurance reimbursements or patent
law exclusivity are thus lower for these forms of innovation, but barriers to
entry from FDA or insurer oversight may be lower as well. To be sure, some
4.
See W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System: Four Roles for
Potential Transformation, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 122 (2019).
5.
To be clear, other laws do shape innovation in this space, including privacy laws, human
subjects research protections, and trade secrecy, though they are not our focus here. See, e.g., SHARONA
HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY (2016)
(providing an overview of medical big data law); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in
the Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37 (2019) (describing medical privacy laws); Kayte
Spector-Bagdady & Reshma Jagsi, Big Data, Ethics, and Regulations: Implications/or Consent in the
Learning Health System, 45 MED. PHYSICS e845 (2018) (describing human subjects protection law);
Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical Data Silos,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641 (2017) (describing regulation and secrecy).
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medical AI innovators do seek patents and FDA approval or clearance.
Nonetheless, medical AI innovation faces a substantially different legal
landscape than more conventional biomedical innovation, such as the
development of physical devices or drugs. 6
Within this landscape, innovation by end-users of medical AI is
flourishing. Health systems (including individual academic medical centers
and hospitals) and insurers are not only developing and using AI
technologies themselves but also setting up in-house venture capital funds
to invest in AI startups. Health systems and insurers have different
incentives than conventional biomedical innovators (such as drug and
device manufacturers). Their primary purpose for innovating is not to sell
innovative products to customers. Instead, they are developing innovative
AI tools to enhance their main business of providing, insuring, or facilitating
health care. In the theoretical model pioneered by Eric von Rippel, 7 they are
"user innovators" rather than seller innovators. 8 They benefit directly from
using their innovations without having to sell or license them to others
(though they may do both). User innovators are more likely to focus on their
own specific needs and circumstances, creating more customized products
for their own use, while seller innovators are more likely to produce
standardized products designed for sale to a broader market of users. 9
Of course, users are not the only innovators of medical AI. Large
6.
We recognize that "difference" demands a baseline. We focus on the biomedical innovation
baseline because the actors we consider here operate largely in the world of drugs, devices, and other
biomedical innovations. But we recognize that this is not the only potential baseline. Interesting insights
could come from focusing on the different baseline of software innovation generally, and considering
how medical AI differs from other software, where patents are of disputed value and FDA regulation
and insurance reimbursement are non-players. See generally, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing the scope
of protection that should be afforded to software patents); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The
Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007) (considering the quality of
software patents); Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (placing
reform proposals for software into historical context). Such an analysis could examine the impact on
software development of heightened regulatory scrutiny relative to an all-software baseline, rather than
the diminished scrutiny relative to medical devices generally that we discuss here. Although that is not
this paper, our analysis does explore the ways in which software-like features of medical AI pose
challenges for both FDA regulation and patent protection of these medical innovations. See infra
Sections III.A, III.B.
7.
See ERIC VON HIPPEL, SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1988) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL, SOURCES];
ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING];
ERIC VON HIPPEL, FREE INNOVATION (2017) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL, FREE].
8.
Von Hippel's earlier work contrasts user innovators with "manufacturers," but we follow
Katherine Strandburg's usage in substituting the term "seller innovators" for the reasons she explains:
"not all seller innovators are manufacturers, while manufacturers can be user innovators of industrial
processes and manufacturing equipment." Katherine J. Strandburg, Users, Patents, and Innovation
Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA w 725 n. l (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss
& Justine Pila eds., 2018).
9.
Id. at 63-76.
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technology companies are developing AI-powered health software for sale
to users, as are small startups. And the IT infrastructure providers of health
care, the makers of electronic health record (EHR) software, are themselves
developing AI algorithms and incorporating them into EHR products. But
the innovation incentives for commercial product developers are somewhat
more familiar and not our focus here.
The rise of user innovation in biomedical AI has several implications for
policymakers. First, it is worth considering that the different legal landscape
in this setting may be making room for different kinds of innovators to
develop different forms of innovation. Just as the ordinarily robust legal
regimes that provide patents, FDA regulation, and insurance reimbursement
for new technologies shape biomedical innovation in drugs and physical
devices, 10 the smaller roles these regimes play for medical AI may shape the
different forms of innovation that we observe in this space, perhaps making
more room for user innovation. Second, the availability and control of data
confer a significant comparative advantage on some innovators in this field,
including large institutional user innovators. AI is easier to develop in-house
for health systems or insurers with their own large stocks of patient health
information. Smaller institutions, or commercial firms without access to
such data, may find it harder to compete. Third, a proliferation of biomedical
user innovators brings challenges as well as opportunities. AI innovations
tailored to one institution's needs and circumstances may not be suitable for
other potential users facing different needs and circumstances. 11 Even larger
institutional datasets are limited in scope, limiting the power and
generalizability of AI solutions based on those datasets. Problems of error,
overfitting, or data biases might go unrecognized without effective
oversight from FDA or insurers. These effects have broader impacts on the
quality, cost, and equity of medical AI more generally.
The rest of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II canvasses the
landscape of user innovation in medical AI and describes the novel
innovators involved, focusing on the roles and incentives of health systems
and health insurers. Part III looks to the primary regimes that scholars have
generally recognized as shaping biomedical innovation-patent law, FDA
oversight, and insurance reimbursement-and explains how their role is
diminished or uncertain for these technologies. Part IV addresses the
implications of these analyses, including concerns around the availability of
10.
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of
Excludability and the Limits ofPatents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance:
Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 193, 201--08 (2016)
[hereinafter Sachs, Prizing Insurance].
11.
VON RIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 33-44.
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data, the customization of local solutions to local problems, and risks of
difficult-to-detect quality concerns. A few brief thoughts conclude.
I. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW INNOVATORS
AI powers a proliferating set of new medical technologies. Some AI
tools are directly involved in patient care, such as systems that diagnose
medical issues or monitor patients for signs of medical problems that can be
aided by early intervention. Some function more in the background, such as
algorithms to predict the likelihood of future adverse outcomes. Still, others
are even further removed from the point of patient care, monitoring and
shaping the flow of patients or providers across a hospital to improve system
efficiency or to increase the volume of care provided. Each of these avenues
has the potential to impact the health care landscape and the experience of
patient care.
The technologies we consider here fall largely outside the scope of
existing policy and legal scholarship on medical AI. That small but growing
body of scholarship has considered legal aspects of commercially developed
AI-driven products that directly drive or inform patient care and that pass
through FDA's traditional review process. 12 An example is IDx-DR, a
software program that diagnoses more-than-mild diabetic retinopathy based
on images of the base of the retina. IDx-DR was cleared in 2018 by FDA as
a Class II medical device and has since been sold commercially and
implemented at sites around the country. 13 FDA has cleared dozens of
medical devices 14 that rely on AI to perform a function like classification,
12.
See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Frank Pasquale, Product Liability Suits for FDA-Regulated
Al/ML Software, in INNOVATION AND PROTECTION: THE FUTURE OF FDA MEDICAL DEVICE
REGULATION (I. Glenn Cohen, Timo Minssen, W. Nicholson Price II, Christopher Robertson & Carmel
Shachar eds., forthcoming 2022); Price, supra note 3; Charlotte Tschider, Medical Device Artificial
Intelligence: The New Tort Frontier, 46 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1551 (2021).
13.
See Letter from Angela C. Krueger, Acting Deputy Dir., Eng'g & Sci. Rev., Off. of Device
Evaluation, to Janice Hagan, Regul. Couns., Hogan Lovells US LLP (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_ docs/pdfl 8/DEN 180001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AK5H-BVYB]
(classifying IDx-DR as a Class II medical device); Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA
Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye
Problems (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-permitsmarketing-artificial-intelligence-based-device-detect-certain-diabetes-related-eye
[https://perma.cc/SZ2L-9ETF]; Aimee Breaux, With New CEO, Artificial Intelligence Start-Up Expects
2020 to Be 'Year of Mass Adoption,' IOWA CITY PRESS CITIZEN (Dec. 11, 2019, 4:42 PM),
https://www.press-citizen.com/story/news/2019/12/11 /coralvi lle-ai-start-up-expects-2020-year-massadoption/4398173002/ [https://perma.ccN7VP-4WK6] ("Abramoff said IDx has sold these devices to
around two dozen hospital systems ... In November, the company announced a new type of client, retail
clinics. The company closed a deal with grocery store chain Albertsons to outfit five of the company's
retail clinics with IDx cameras.").
14.
As of September 2020, sixty-four machine learning or AI-based algorithms and devices had
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diagnosis, or risk prediction. These products, while important, are not our
focus here. Instead, we consider the vast breadth of AI-powered medical
technology that arises outside the typical product development path.
The innovators we consider in this project-health systems and
insurers-are user innovators. Although much of the user innovation
literature in recent years has focused on individuals and hobbyists rather
than institutions and professional researchers, the defining characteristic of
user innovators is not their identity or status, but their functional relationship
to the innovation at hand. They innovate to address their own immediate
problems or to adapt available technologies to work for their purposes,
typically because commercially available products are inadequate to meet
those needs. 15 This distinguishes these innovators from companies
specializing in the development and sale of cutting-edge health care
technologies such as pharmaceuticals or medical devices for sale to others. 16
Those companies aim to supply broader markets with new therapeutic
products after shepherding them through costly premarket testing,
navigating complex federal bureaucracies to secure intellectual property
rights, FDA clearance or approval to gain market access, and showing that
they qualify for insurance reimbursement to ensure commercial success.
The cost, risk, and time needed to bring to market a new pharmaceutical 17
been approved by FDA. See Stan Benjamens, Pranavsingh Dhunnoo & Bertalan Mesk6, The State of
Artificial Intelligence-Based FDA-Approved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An Online Database, 3
NPJ DIGIT. MED. 1, 1 (2020). To be sure, there is substantial contestable space about what in this field
counts as a "medical device;" we consider those questions to some extent in Section III.A.
15.
We do not mean to suggest that commercial products are not available to serve these goals.
For instance, Epic, the largest EHR vendor in the United States has developed and implemented a sepsis
predictor, in addition to the health system-developed ones we describe in this Part. Meg Bryant, Epic,
Cerner Control 85% ofLarge Hospital EHR Space, KLAS Reports, HEALTHCARE DIVE (May 2, 2019),
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/epic-cemer-control-85-of-large-hospital-ehr-space-klasreports/553906/ [https://perma.cc/NC2E-7QK9]; Bill Siwicki, Health System Uses Epic EHR
Communications Tech to Reduce Sepsis Mortality Rate by 20%, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Oct. 1,
2019,
I :02
PM),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/health-system-uses-epic-ehrcommunications-tech-reduce-sepsis-mortality-rate-20 [https://perma.cc/ECR9-ACFW]. But even with
the existence of tools like these, many health systems have chosen to develop their own products.
16.
A previous line of demarcation between these entities had been the difference between
products, regulated by FDA, and practice, regulated by the states and medical bodies. But the increase
in tools like the ones discussed here, particularly in the clinical decision support area, have blurred or
even eliminated this distinction.
17.
Although the precise cost to develop a new drug is hotly debated, there is no question that
pharmaceuticals are among the most costly new products to bring to market, with estimates typically
placing the cost to develop a new drug at well over a billion dollars. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry
G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates ofR&D
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (estimating pre-approval costs to be $2.558 billion); JORGE
MESTRE-FERRANDIZ, JON SUSSEX & ADRIAN TOWSE, OFF. HEALTH ECON, THE R&D COST OF A NEW
MEDICINE (2012 ), http://www. slideshare. net/O HEN ews/rd-cost-of-anew-medicine-mestre-ferrandizl9-jan2013 [https://perma.cc/MV9Q-TMJS] (estimating costs at $1.5 billion); Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged
Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419,426, 448-57 (2014).
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or medical device 18 limit the companies that are able to succeed in this
complex environment. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies
specialize in dealing with these regulatory structures and are shaped by
these legal and financial dynamics.
The medical AI innovation context we examine here is quite different.
FDA regulation, patents, and insurance payments still matter, but the costs
of navigating the legal landscape are less daunting, and the rewards more
uncertain (as we will discuss infra, in Part III). Innovation depends less on
the ability to conduct clinical trials than on access to large volumes of data
collected in the course of clinical care. In this environment, health systems
and insurers have begun to play more significant roles in medical Al
innovation.

A. Health Systems
Health systems 19 play an integral role in the delivery of health care
services as well as in health care research. However, they have typically not
been a focus of legal academic scholarship about the development of new
health care technology products. 20 To be sure, the medical literature
recognizes that hospitals-particularly academic medical centers-serve as
research sites in the clinical trials process, providing patients for enrollment
in trials to test the safety and effectiveness of a candidate drug or device. 21
But in these contexts, the outside product manufacturer may be the party in
control of the research, rather than the hospital or health system itself.

18.
JOSH MAKOWER, AABED MEER & LYN DENEND, FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL
INNOVATION 28 (20 I 0), http://www.medtecheurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/01112010_FDAimpact-on-US-medical-technology-innovation_ Backgrounder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D22-S4JS]
(estimating the cost of developing a Class III medical device at $94 million).
19.
By health system, we mean a set of health care organizations that are contractually affiliated
with each other, particularly including the relationship between hospitals and outpatient physician
organizations. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. & QUALITY, Defining Health Systems (Sept.
2 0 I 7), https ://www. ahrq. gov/chsp/chsp-reports/resources-for-understanding-health-systems/ defininghea lth-systems. html [https://perma.cc/K7UX-3BFV]. While we recognize that individual hospitals may
have slightly different incentives and capacities than health systems, for the sake of convenience we
generally include individual hospitals within the broad term "health system."
20.
Of course, considerable research occurs in hospitals, particularly in academic medical
centers, including developing new medical procedures or protocols. But legal scholarship in intellectual
property and innovation policy has largely focused on the commercial development of new health care
technology products, perhaps in part because the Patent Act explicitly bars the enforcement of patents
granted on medical procedures. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); Jonas Anderson, Nonexcludable Surgical
Method Patents, 61 WM. & MARYL. REV. 637,657 (2020).
21.
See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000); Hamilton Moses III, Eugene
Braunwald, Joseph B. Martin & Samuel 0. Thier, Collaborating with Industry-Choices for the
Academic Medical Center, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1371-72 (2002).
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The dynamics are different in the context of AI technologies. Health
systems themselves have played a larger role in driving the development of
a wide range of innovative AI products, but with different incentives than
those of the product developing firms that are the focus of much of the
scholarly literature. In the AI context, health systems are less concerned
with the ability to obtain patents, the prospect of securing insurance
reimbursement for their new products, or the need to traverse the FDA
clearance or approval process.
Instead, they seek to reduce their own costs, increase clinical volume and
revenue, improve quality, and satisfy genuine scientific curiosity.
Importantly, though, health systems may be unable to meet these goals with
one-size-fits-all AI products. Different health systems may not only weigh
these goals differently, but also have different patient populations and
different structural constraints that they must accommodate through
customization and training of AI products. Hospitals of different sizes, with
different specialties, or with different seasonal patient volumes will need to
develop different ways of managing capacity strain and provider staffing,
for example.
These features make the development of AI models for health systems
(sometimes in collaboration with external firms) a good candidate for user
innovation. 22 Some problems differ across institutions enough that off-theshelf models have limited value; AI allows health systems to address such
challenges. Health systems, in many cases, have sufficient resources to
develop their own models (or at least to contribute substantially to the
development of such models ). 23 Medical AI tools trained on their own data
offer health systems opportunities to improve their own operations at a
reasonable cost. Use of their own data both limits the costs of innovation
and ensures that the results are targeted to their own needs and
circumstances.
Health systems face a number of motivations to pursue this innovation.
They feel pressure to compete on quality, especially in light of HHS'
imposition of financial penalties for particular types of complications-and
financial bonuses for others. 24 High-quality medical care can be difficult to
22.
Other scholars have applied the user innovation paradigm to a wide range of innovation
settings. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 467,472 (2008) (biomedical research tools); Christopher Buccafusco, Disability and
Design, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 952, 1007 (2020) (products for people with disabilities); see generally, e.g.,
William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2012)
(other consumer goods).
23.
See VON RIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 33.
24.
See infra text accompanying note 180. The federal government also operates searchable
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deliver consistently because of differences among patients that are difficult
to observe. Ideally, caregivers would monitor patients continuously along
many dimensions, using all available information to choose exactly the right
intervention for each patient at exactly the right time. This would allow
caregivers to treat patients quickly and effectively while also avoiding
unnecessary treatment. But it is a challenging goal. Constant monitoring is
resource-intensive, and accurate analysis requires skill and knowledge. AI
can help by monitoring patients and predicting or quickly identifying
adverse events in time for intervention. 25 Because AI systems base their
predictions on huge amounts of data, the underlying rationale may be
opaque to human observers. 26 Many health systems have begun to develop
AI tools that will assist physicians in lowering their institutions' rates of
different types of adverse events.
At the University of Michigan, researchers developed a predictor for the
risk of infection with Clostridium difficile (C. diff.), a bacterium that infects
hundreds of thousands of patients per year in health care settings. 27 C. diff.
can be deadly or debilitating, and has become increasingly resistant to
antibiotic treatment. 28 The Michigan team used electronic health record
(EHR) data from many thousands of patients to develop the predictive tool,
which now makes daily predictions at Michigan Medicine to identify
patients at high risk of infection for closer monitoring. The predictor is
based on hundreds of EHR-derived variables, some of which accord with
prior clinical understanding (e.g., high respiratory rate) but most of which
do not. 29 The predictor can also be used to drive systematic improvements,
such as isolating particularly vulnerable patients from the rest of the health
system's population to protect them from infection.
databases, including Hospital Compare and Physician Compare, that enable searches by certain quality
of care metrics, such as mortality rates. These databases may exert indirect pressures on those metrics
as well. See Nathan Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. I, 8, 24, 56 (2018).
25.
For an analysis of the translational process and a list of products in development, including
many originating in academia, see Mark P. Sendak et al., A Path for Translation of Machine Learning
Products into Healthcare Delivery, EMJ INNOVATIONS 19-00172 (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.33590/emjinnov/l 9-00172 [https://perma.cc/U28Q-N9GM].
26.
Opacity to observers sometimes gives a comparative advantage to user innovators over seller
innovators in other contexts as well. Von Hippe! uses the term "sticky information" to describe
information held by users that they cannot readily transfer to others. See VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING,
supra note 7, at 67-70.
27.
Jeeheh Oh et al., A Generalizable, Data-Driven Approach to Predict Daily Risk of
Clostridium Difficile Infection at Two Large Academic Health Centers, 39 INFECTION CONTROL &
HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 425 (2018).
28.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE
UNITED STA TES vii (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/threats-report/20 l 9-ar-threatsreport-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GR3-9SCH]
29.
Benjamin Y. Li et al., Using Machine Leaming and the Electronic Health Record to Predict
Complicated Clostridium Difficile Infection, 6 OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASE ofz 186 (2019).
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Other health systems have developed their own C. diff. prediction tools
trained on their own data. 30 Some have tried to create one-size-fits-all
models that work for all institutions, but have encountered difficulties based
on differences between health systems. 31 The Michigan team collaborated
with researchers from Mass General Hospital on an intermediate approach:
a generalizable method that can be used to develop models that fit the
particular health systems that will use them. 32
Duke University has developed and implemented its Sepsis Watch
system to monitor patients for sepsis. Sepsis is a serious and often fatal
condition in which the body's inflammatory response to an infection goes
into overdrive. It can quickly become fatal and kills about 270,000 patients
annually in the United States. Duke's AI system, trained on EHR data,
makes real-time predictions about patients' risk of sepsis and alerts a rapid
response team to intervene early and catch sepsis in its early stages. The
system is relatively opaque because "[ c]linical leaders ... were willing to
trade-off model interpretability for performance gains."33 Researchers did
not prioritize model interpretability, because sepsis may have many causes,
and treatment does not depend on which of those causes is present. Duke
developed the system in its main hospital and has since rolled it out-with
substantial effort and adaptation-at its two other, smaller hospitals. 34
During adoption, Duke explicitly promoted the system to providers "as a
home-grown solution to an important problem within the hospital,"35though Duke has since licensed Cohere Med to develop the unpatented
system for wider use in other settings. 36
Health systems are also acutely interested in patient readmission-that
30.
Id.
31.
See, e.g., Xi Na et al., A Multi-Center Prospective Derivation and Validation of a Clinical
Prediction Tool for Severe Clostridium Difficile Infection, l 0 PLOS ONE e0 123405 (2015).
32.
Oh et al., supra note 27.
33.
Mark Sendak et al., Real-World Integration of a Sepsis Deep Learning Technology into
Routine Clinical Care: Implementation Study, 8 JMIR MED. INFORMATICS 1, 6 (2020).
34.
Mark Sendak et al., "The Human Body is a Black Box": Supporting Clinical DecisionMaking With Deep Learning, FAT* 2020: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 99 (2020), https://doi.org/10.l 145/3351095.3372827
[https://perma.cc/Q48U-QW7] (describing the development of Sepsis Watch as a sociotechnical
system); Andrew Ng, THE BATCH (Apr. 15, 2020), https://blog.deeplearning.ai/blog/the-batch-ai-formedicine-special-eric-topols-planetary-health-system-discovering-drugs-diagnosing-heart-diseasepredicting-infections-alexa-for-doctors [https://perma.cc/HLW9-Q3MQ] (noting the deployment of
Sepsis Watch to two community hospitals).
35.
Sendak et al., supra note 33, at 8. In order to increase provider buy-in, "[t]hroughout the
design, development, and implementation process, Sepsis Watch was described as a 'tool' to support
physicians and nurses in the ED and the term 'artificial intelligence' was not used in any communication
or presentation." Id. at 10.
36.
Press Release, Duke Translation & Commercialization, "Deep Sepsis" Licensed to Cohere
Med
(July
3,
2019),
https://olv.duke.edu/news/deep-sepsis-licensed-to-cohere-med/
[https://perma.cc/MF78-ZSP3].
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is, the likelihood that a discharged patient will be readmitted to a hospital
within a given time frame (typically thirty days). Thirty-day readmission
rate is a marker of care quality, and something health systems try to
minimize. 37 Readmission within a short time frame is a sign that something
has gone wrong with the patient's care: perhaps the patient's issues were
not properly resolved, or the patient should not have been discharged yet.
Multiple health systems have developed their own AI-powered tools to
identify patients at high risk of readmission to target them for intervention
(such as assigning a nurse to coordinate their outpatient care). Researchers
at the University of Texas Southwestern hospital in Dallas developed a
thirty-day readmission model, which they externally validated in seven
large hospitals. 38 UT Southwestern has since spun out the model to the
private firm Pieces, which now offers it as a part of its "Pieces Predict"
commercial product. 39
Yet another example: Intermountain Healthcare has partnered with an
external firm to develop better ways of managing patients with chronic
kidney disease, with the goal of reducing hospitalizations and improving
outcomes. 40 Tools like these could enable health systems to provide better
care at a lower cost-while maintaining existing levels of service provision
and insurance reimbursement. 41
Health systems generally seek to increase clinical volume and revenue
where possible. They therefore have incentives to develop AI tools that can,
for example, assist physicians in completing procedures more quickly or
identify additional patients who would benefit from further services. One
such example comes from Cedars-Sinai in Los Angeles, 42 which has
developed an AI tool to reduce capacity strain on the system. Capacity strain
may lead to crowded ERs, delays or cancellations of surgeries, unnecessary
3 7.
See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 24, at 57.
38.
Ruben Amarasingham et al., Electronic Medical Record-Based Multicondition Models to
Predict the Risk of 30 Day Readmission or Death Among Adult Medicine Patients: Validation and
Comparison to Existing Models, 15 BMC MED. lNFORMA TICS DECISION MAKERS 39 (2015); Sendak et
al., supra note 25.
39.
Our Products, PIECES TECHS., https://piecestech.com [https://perma.cc/RD69-F8BX].
40.
Jessica Kent, Applying Artificial Intelligence to Chronic Disease Management, HEALTH IT
ANALYTICS (Sept. 18, 2020), https://healthitanalytics.com/features/applying-artificial-intelligence-tochronic-disease-management (https://perma.cc/RN4U-CEDA].
41.
Hospitals have less incentive to reduce their costs of care if doing so will lower their overall
reimbursement totals or profit margins. As such, these tools are likely to be more powerful where
hospitals are operating in a managed-care or otherwise value-based context, rather than in a pure feefor-service model. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10--13 (1999).
42.
Slideshow at 19, Michael Thompson, New Ways to Improve Hospital Flow with Predictive
Analytics,
HEALTH
CATALYST
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.healthcatalyst.com/learn/webinars/improve-hospital-flow-with-predictive-analytics/
(slides on file with author).
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readmissions, and provider burnout. By predicting more accurately the
hospital's patient census, the Cedars-Sinai AI tool aims to decrease
treatment delays, improve staff schedules (including reducing the need to
pay overtime), and increase admissions, while avoiding overcrowding.
Other examples focus on resource allocation and efficiency, decreasing
the resources needed for care and, perhaps simultaneously, increasing the
volume of care provided with existing resources. Duke is using AI to
optimize bed flow-that is, the movement of patients between different
hospital units during different time periods after admission. 43 After the
COVID-19-related shutdown of elective surgery, Duke also turned to AI to
prioritize the most important elective surgeries44 and to reduce costs by
allowing low-risk patients to be "admitted" to the hospital while staying
home and receiving in-person visits, telemedical care, and remote
monitoring. 45
Health systems also aim to reduce different types of costs. In particular,
health systems seek to reduce back-end costs related to coding, billing, and
transacting with third parties (such as insurers or regulators), as these costs
do not themselves either serve a direct patient care mission or gamer
reimbursement for the hospital. 46 They represent administrative frictions
that cannot be eliminated entirely but are often far higher in the highlyfragmented U.S. health care system (where providers must develop the
infrastructure to contract with and bill a variety of different insurers) than
in other, less-fragmented health care systems. 47 Some AI innovations assist
health systems in reducing these back-end costs. For example, one health
43.
Alexander Fenn et al., Development and Validation of Machine learning Models to Predict
Admission from Emergency Department to Inpatient and Intensive Care Units, 78 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 290 (2021).
44.
Benjamin A. Goldstein et al., Development and Pe,formance of a Clinical Decision Support
Tool to Inform Resource Utilization for Elective Operations, 3 JAMA NETWORK OPEN e2023547
(2020).
45.
Development and Implementation of a Hospital at Home Program in Wake County, DUKE
INST. FOR HEALTH INNOVATION (2021 ), https://dihi.org/project/development-and-implementation-of-ahospital-at-home-program-in-wake-county/ [https://perma.cc/7X9D-WHXA]; Press Release, Ctr. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces Comprehensive Strategy to Enhance Hospital Capacity
Amid COVID-19 Surge (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cmsannounces-comprehensive-strategy-enhance-hospital-capacity-amid-covid-19-surge
[https://perma.cc/B8UL-DBV5].
46.
To be sure, many businesses in other industries must also manage their costs for these types
of administrative burdens. But as noted above, these pressures loom large in the highly-fragmented U.S.
health care system.
47.
See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein, Terry Campbell & Steffie Woolhandler, Health Care
Administrative Costs in the United States and Canada, 2017, 172 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. I (2020);
Steffie Woolhandler, Terry Campbell & David U. Himmelstein, Costs ofHealth Care Administration in
the United States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 768 (2003); KAREN DAVIS ET AL., SLOWING THE
GROWTH OF U.S. HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4
(Jan. 2007).
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system uses AI to analyze physician visit notes for reimbursable events that
were not coded for reimbursement and flags those events for human
review. 48 This system not only increases revenue for already-provided care;
it also decreases the cost of human review devoted to billing. 49
Although health systems are businesses subject to standard corporate
financial incentives, 50 scientific curiosity often plays a motivating role as
well. Academic medical centers, in particular, perform clinical research in
addition to providing patient care. 51 For academic medical centers,
advancing knowledge is a part of the institutional mission-and given the
substantial grant funds available for biomedical research, including in the
medical AI field, 52 innovation may also have financial implications. 53
Academic medical centers have been at the forefront of new AI research
that might be less attractive to commercial firms focused on lucrative sales
of patented products and insurance reimbursement. Some of this research
more closely resembles traditional basic research into the drivers and
progression of certain conditions 54 than it resembles the more applied
innovations being developed for the prevention of sepsis or readmissions
described above. Many of these basic-research initiatives are governmentfunded and use techniques of artificial intelligence and machine learning to
gain a greater understanding of particularly complex conditions, such as
Alzheimer's Disease or brain genomics more generally. 55
The smaller role of the traditional innovation policy levers discussed in
48.
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Head of an Academic Medical Center's Machine
Learning Program (Dec. 30, 2020).
49.
Id.
50.
See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Hospitals Knew How to Make Money. Then Coronavirus Happened.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/hospitals-revenuecoronavirus.html (https://perma.cc/KKV2-VHNY].
51.
Of course, non-academic medical centers are also made up of health care providers who may
be individually motivated by genuine scientific and medical curiosity.
52.
See, e.g., NAT'L INST. BIOMEDICAL IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, Research Funding:
Artificial
Intelligence,
Machine
Learning,
and
Deep
Learning
(2020),
https://www.nibib.nih.gov/research-funding/machine-learning
(https://perma.ccNXX7-GEWE];
Amarnath R. Annapureddy et al., The National Institutes of Health Funding for Clinical Research
Applying Machine Learning Techniques in 2017, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED. 1 (2020).
53.
Those financial implications can extend as well to individual academic innovators, who may
sometimes found commercial spin-off companies from their academic work. See, e.g., supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
54.
Basic research describes research aimed at fundamental understanding more than applied
uses for that understanding. See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERK. TECH. L.J. I, 11-12 (2019)
(describing funding for basic research).
55.
See, e.g., XI Luo, NATIONAL INSTS. HEAL TH REPORT, LARGE-SCALE NETWORK MODELING
FOR
BRAIN
DYNAMICS:
STATISTICAL
LEARNING
AND
OPTIMIZATION
(2019),
https ://projectreporter. n ih. gov/project_info_description .cfrn ?aid=989903 3& icde
[https://perma.cc/3G7L-E47F]; LI SHEN, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH REPORT, INTEGRATIVE
BIOINFORMATICS APPROACHES TO HUMAN BRAIN GENOMICS AND CONNECTOMICS (2019),
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Part III may, if anything, enhance the comparative advantage of user
innovators and make it easier for health systems to engage in this broad
range of AI innovation. Health systems seeking to develop AI technologies
can do so with far less financial investment than companies developing
traditional medical products, for several reasons. Rather than paying for
costly data collection through clinical trials or acquiring data held by other
institutions, they can repurpose data that they have already created in the
form of health care records of clinical care. 56 Moreover, for reasons more
fully explained in Section III.A, they are much less likely to go through a
costly FDA review process for their AI technologies.
As a result of these lower development costs, health systems may not
need substantial, standalone reimbursements for these innovations and can
instead recoup their investments directly through their own use to reduce
costs, to increase the volume of care they deliver and bill for, or to improve
quality metrics. In other cases, health systems are covering their investment
expenses by obtaining grants or prize awards (most notably but not only
from the federal government). 57 In still other situations, as noted above,
health systems may develop these AI tools in collaboration with outside
firms, contributing their valuable patient health data for the company's
use. 58 Patent protection may be less important for these AI technologies
because of the difficulty for competitors of reproducing technologies that
rely on access to confidential data sets and use opaque algorithms. 59 Finally,
patent protection may be superfluous for truly bespoke innovations that are
customized to meet the needs of the innovator, because they may not be
suitable for use by competitors.
h ttps ://proj ectreporter. nih. gov/project_ info_description. cfm ?aid=969468 8
[https ://perma. cc/UH3 U2RAN].
56.
For instance, Duke developed a kidney risk algorithm and integrated it into clinical practice
for only $217,138. Mark P. Sendak, Suresh Balu & Kevin A. Schulman, Barriers to Achieving
Economics of Scale in Analysis of EHR Data, 8 APPLIED CUN. INFORMATICS 826, 828 (2017).
Nevertheless, continuing the theme of local innovation, the developers estimated that scaling the
algorithm nationally would cost $38.8 million. Id.
57.
See CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Al Health Outcomes Challenge (2019),
https://ai.cms.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6X8C-UHBP] (listing Geisinger, Jefferson Health, Mayo Clinic,
Northwestern, UV A as health systems receiving awards).
58.
See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and Protecting Patient
Privacy, 322 JAM. MED. ASS'N 1141 (2019); Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Raymond Hutchinson, Erin
O'Brien Kaleba & Sachin Kheterpal, Sharing Health Data and Biospecimens with Industry - A
Principle-Driven, Practical Approach, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2072 (2020). Some of these
collaborations have been the subject of significant controversy, particularly where physicians or
scientists at nonprofit institutions have obtained equity stakes in profit-driven companies. See, e.g.,
Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Sloan-Kettering's Cozy Deal with Start-Up Ignites a New Uproar,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/health/memorial-sloan-ketteringcancer-paige-ai.html [https://perma.ccN9RV-XLY3].
59.
See Price, supra note 3, at 434.
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B. Insurers
Health insurers are longtime stakeholders in the delivery and coverage
of health care services. Insurers themselves are a varied group with
diverging interests. Even putting aside the role of the federal government as
an insurer, providing coverage for more than 100 million Americans
through Medicare and Medicaid alone, 60 private insurers play a range of
different roles in health care delivery and coverage. Insurance companies
may provide insurance for businesses that offer health benefits to their
employees, or may serve as third-party administrators that process insurance
claims for employers who self-insure coverage for their employees. 6 I
Insurance companies may offer fee-for-service plans, reimbursing providers
for each service they provide, or they may use a managed care model,
requiring providers to work within more tightly specified budgets. 62 Private
insurance firms even play a large role in the deployment of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, as twenty-four million seniors now purchase
privately-run Medicare Advantage plans63 and nearly fifty-four million
Medicaid enrollees have their coverage provided by comprehensive
Managed Care Organizations through private insurers. 64
In general, however, insurers have not featured prominently in
discussions of the process of innovation into new health care technologies. 65
60.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 109 (2015),
https://www .ems.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJFinal.pdf (https://perma.cc/BS 7R-LHFF].
61.
Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
127,188 (2017).
62.
Korobkin, supra note 41, at 10, 12-13.
63.
Meredith Freed, Anthony Damico & Tricia Neuman, A Dozen Facts About Medicare
Advantage in 2020, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/adozen-facts-about-medi care-advantage-in-2020/ [https ://perma. cc/M6TA-3 L5 G].
64.
Elizabeth Hinton, Robin Rudowitz, Lina Stolyar & Natalie Singer, JO Things to Know About
Medicaid Managed Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebri ef/ 10-th in gs-to-know-about-medicaid-managed-care/ [https ://perma.cc/Z2SC-2X9V].
65.
Although as discussed infra in Section III.C, a growing body of scholarship has started to
address the role that insurers and reimbursement may play in the health innovation space. See, e.g.,
Sachs, Prizing insurance, supra note 10 (describing insurance reimbursement incentives for insurers);
Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95
N. Y. U. L. REV. 75 (2020) (describing how Medicare reimbursement creates subsidies for particular types
of biomedical innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting Institutional Roles in Biomedical Innovation
in a Learning Healthcare System, 14 J. INST. ECON. 1139 (2018) (describing the new role of insurers in
innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the
Demand Side, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017) (describing innovation by insurers themselves). Payers
have also played an indirect role in innovation to the extent that they have performed technology
assessments in deciding whether and under what circumstances to pay for particular products, in which
the payers consider the clinical evidence supporting the product. See, e.g., Julia R. Trosman, Stephanie
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But the role of insurers has changed for new AI technologies. Like the
hospitals and health systems described above, insurers have incentives to
reduce care costs and increase efficiency that has driven them to invest in
the development of certain types of new AI products. 66 Insurers can also be
user innovators seeking to develop customized products for use in their own
operations.
Insurers have financial motivations to reduce care costs. If an insurer has
budgeted a particular amount of money for the care of each beneficiary each
year, costs that exceed that projected budget will often be borne by the
insurer, not by an employer or by the patient. Insurers thus have incentives
to discourage patients from seeking unnecessary care, where possible. For
example, an insurer might prefer that a patient see a primary care doctor or
visit an urgent care clinic for non-emergency care, rather than going to a
(more expensive) emergency room. 67 Many insurers have developed nonAI initiatives designed to help patients figure out what type of care might
be right for them, such as providing 24-hour triage nurse lines. 68
Insurers are also working on AI-based products that help both doctors
and patients to make triage decisions. Highmark, affiliated with Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, aims to use AI tools both to prevent the onset of chronic
conditions and to treat them more effectively. 69 Highmark's recent
development partnership with Google Cloud will allow Highmark to
contribute its patient data to the collaboration, with the goal of benefiting

L. Van Bebber & Kathryn A. Phillips, Coverage Policy Development for Personalized Medicine: Private
Payer Perspectives on Developing Policy for the 21-Gene Assay, 61. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 238 (2010).
66.
In Section III.C, we discuss the role of insurers in providing reimbursement for hospitalbased AI model use.
67.
At least one large insurance company, Anthem, has developed a policy of denying coverage
for emergency room visits that it later deems to have been "unnecessary." This policy has come under
strong criticism, as patients themselves do not always know whether a hospital visit is "necessary" when
symptoms are concerning. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, An ER Visit, a $12,000 Bill - And a Health Insurer
That Wouldn't Pay, Vox (Jan. 29, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpo Ii tics/201 8/ l /2 9/ 169065 5 8/anthem-emergency-room-coverage-denials-inappropriate
[https://perma.cc/D22K-H3E2]; Samantha Raphelson, Anthem Policy Discouraging "Avoidable"
Emergency Room
Visits Faces
Criticism,
NPR
(May
23,
2018,
4:18
PM),
https ://www.npr.org/2018/05/2 3/61364 9094/anthem-po Iicy-discouraging-avoidable-emergency-roomvis its-faces-criticism [https://perma.cc/KSY7-2N3Q].
68.
See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Health Insurers Hire Thousands of Nurses to Coordinate Care,
FORBES (Sept. 25, 2015, 7:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/09/25/healthinsurers-hire-thousands-of-nurses-amid-shift-to-value-based-care/#51531d96d9d7
[https://perma.cc/4UEN-VBAP].
69.
Jim Molis, Al Tools Improves Care to Patients with Chronic Conditions - and Savings for
Insurers
and
Employers,
PITT.
Bus.
TIMES
(May
1,
2020),
https://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2020/05/01/ai-tools-improves-care-to-patients-withchronic.htrnl [https://perma.cc/W45W-MJ6V].

2022]

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

1139

from Google Cloud's AI expertise. 70 At least some of these AI tools-such
as one developed by Optum, a division of UnitedHealth, to better manage
patients with chronic conditions-have resulted in disturbing racially
disparate impacts on patients,7 1 a topic to which we return in Part V.
Closely related to reducing the costs of care, insurers are motivated to
increase efficiency in the reimbursement process. Just as hospitals and
health systems must develop the infrastructure to contract with and bill
many different insurers for the care they provide to their patients, insurers
must develop the infrastructure to work with many different health care
providers and to manage the claim review process. Insurers are working to
develop AI-based technologies for reducing the administrative costs and
frictions of these interactions. For example, Optum has also developed AI
models to help review provider claims. 72 Overall, the innovation incentives
of insurers seem more tightly tied to reducing costs along multiple
dimensions, both care-based and administrative.
C. Venture Capital Investments

In addition to developing AI tools either in-house or in partnerships with
external firms, both health systems and insurers are also pursuing new ways
to provide venture capital funding for outside innovators. 73 At least some of
these VC-funded efforts are designed to produce novel AI-based
technologies. Many of them also fall into the above categories-for
instance, Cigna Ventures has invested in a company using AI to target
precision medicine efforts, aiming to target treatments to particular
70.
Press Release, Highmark Health, Highmark Health Partners with Google Cloud to Raise
Standard for Customer and Clinician Engagement in Health (Dec.
17, 2020),
https://www .highmarkhealth.org/hmk/newsroom/pr/2020/2020-12-17-Living-Health.shtml
[https://perma.cc/D7RS-W26Z].
71.
Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting Racial
Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Quinn
Gawronski, Racial Bias Found in Widely Used Health Care Algorithm, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:07
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/racial-bias-found-widely-used-health-care-algorithmn 1076436 [https://perma.cc/N3TH-5L97].
72.
Tom Davenport & Randy Bean, Optum Focuses on AI to Improve Administrative Decisions,
FORBES (Oct. 9, 2020, 10:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomdavenport/2020/l 0/09/optumfocuses-on-ai-to-i mprove-adm in istrative-decis ions/?sh=4c0408086dad
[https ://perma. cc/K48T DVSC].
73.
The named insurers are not the only ones to have developed venture funds. For instance,
BlueCross BlueShield has also developed a Venture Fund. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association,
Blue Venture Fund, https://blueventurefund.com/ [https://perma.cc/6QAB-MFTS]. BCBS has also
engaged in novel innovation challenges, such as its Data Innovation Challenge which rewarded the
winning firms (of over 130 applicants) not with money, but with access to patient data. BlueCross
BlueShield Association, Thrive Earlier Detection Wins the BlueCross BlueShield Data Innovation
Challenge
(2019),
https://www .bcbs.com/bluecross-blueshield-data-innovation-challenge
[https://perma.cc/RM6L-MRS9].
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patients. 74 UnitedHealth' s Optum Ventures has devoted a portion of its $600
million venture fund to Mindstrong Health, 75 which seeks to deliver mental
health care virtually in a way that functions to "lower[] the inpatient
readmission rate" and "ER admission rate." 76
Health systems also fund innovations that come directly from their own
internal work, but which may need further external development. Several of
these funds are sponsored by large, well-known health systems-such as
the Mayo Clinic 77 and the Cleveland Clinic 78-but many smaller health
systems have funds as well. Providence Ventures, the venture capital fund
of Seattle-based Providence Health & Services, plans to invest $150 million
in new IT products "designed to improve care coordination, patient
engagement, data analytics" and other priorities. 79
When these innovators are working to meet their own needs rather than
to sell to a commercial market, they respond differently to the set of legal
levers that policymakers often use to manage innovation-a subject to
which we now tum. These innovators are relatively undeterred by the
uncertainty of patent protection for their innovations, and if they are not
selling a product, they have no need to reassure purchasers that the high
price of their innovations will be covered by insurance. At the same time,
in some cases, these AI innovators may avoid the lengthy, risky FDA review
process before putting their products to use, making the costs of developing
these AI products far lower than the costs of developing conventional
therapeutic products for commercial sale. These altered dynamics help
explain both why different innovation stakeholders have emerged as
significant movers in medical AI innovation and also how those
stakeholders' incentives are shaped.
IL DIMINISHED LEGAL REGIMES: QUALITY OVERSIGHT AND INCENTIVES

74.
Tracey Walker, Cigna Leverages AI, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXEC. (July 15, 2019),
https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/article/cigna-leverages-ai
[https://perrna.cc/6VJUGY6VJ.
75.
Christopher Snowbeck, Opium Ventures Backs Startup That Uses AI To Aid in Medical
Diagnosis, STAR TR!B. (Sept. 26, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.startribune.com/optum-ventures-backsstartup-that-uses-ai-to-aid-i n-medical-diagnosis/4 94 3 77 661 /?refresh=true
[https ://perrna.cc/2ZHTGENS].
76.
About
Us,
MINDSTRONG
HEALTH,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210225221555/https://mindstrong.com/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2021).
77.
Business
Development,
MAYO
CLINIC
VENTURES
(2021),
http://ventures.mayoclinic.org/business-development.php [https://perrna.cc/NK48-FTAW).
78.
The Rise ofHospital-Backed Venture Capital Funds, BECKER'S HOSP. REV. (Oct. 15, 2014),
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-inforrnation-technology/the-rise-of-hospitalbacked-venture-capital-funds.html [https://perrna.cc/ED6K-Y2S2].
79.
Id.
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Three major legal regimes that shape other kinds of biomedical
innovation are less robust in the context of these new AI technologies than
they are for other biomedical innovation. Most of these AI tools are subject
to substantially less rigorous FDA scrutiny than are traditional new
prescription drugs or medical devices, either as a matter of statutory
constraint or as a matter of FDA' s exercise of enforcement discretion. Patent
incentives are less reliable for several reasons, including limitations on
patent-eligible subject matter under U.S. law and difficulties complying
with patent law disclosure requirements for algorithms that are opaque and
constantly changing. Patents may also be less important because of the
effectiveness of trade secrecy for these innovations or because these
customized products are not suitable for other users and therefore less
vulnerable to free riding. And because most of the AI technologies involved
are not reimbursable by insurers, insurance coverage determinations fail to
supply either direct incentives or an independent source of quality oversight.
The relative weakness of these regimes for these AI technologies, on one
hand, reduces the legal incentives that usually motivate seller innovators,
but on the other hand, reduces barriers to entry. At the same time, the
weakness of these regimes limits the levers available to policymakers
seeking to shape the development of this burgeoning set of AI tools. Other
mechanisms are available-grants or prizes could drive development, and
tort law or state medical boards could provide oversight-but the traditional
policy levers are harder to pull.

A. FDA Regulation
FDA performs a critical technology oversight role under the Food, Drug
& Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 80 before many new biomedical technologies may
be introduced in commerce. Although regulation adds to the costs of
developing these products, it also promotes innovation in at least two ways.
First, by demanding that data from clinical trials of new products be
collected and submitted to FDA as a condition for premarket approval or
clearance, regulation motivates innovating firms to invest in a costly and
socially valuable form of R&D. Second, by imposing regulatory entry
barriers on other firms before they can market competing versions of
successful new technologies, regulation gives innovators a head start before
they face price-lowering competition. 81

80.
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (l 938)(codified as amended in provisions set forth in Title
21 of the U.S. Code).
81.
See Eisenberg, supra note 10.
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The regulatory landscape appears to be quite different for many
technologies described in this Article. Health systems and insurers are
routinely developing and implementing AI systems that shift the way care
is provided, whether directly or indirectly, without seeking FDA clearance
or approval-indeed, as of this writing, to our knowledge, no FDA cleared
or approved AI devices were sponsored by health systems, hospitals,
academic medical centers, or insurers. 82 And yet, such user innovators
regularly deploy their own AI-based systems, as described above. What
explains this difference?
Leaving aside the possibility that some innovators may be flouting FDA
requirements, there are several good reasons that the agency keeps a lower
profile here. Some of the technologies considered in this paper are likely
beyond the reach of FDA's regulatory authority. Others may be within
FDA's authority, but it may decline to regulate them as a matter of
enforcement discretion because of its current perception that they do not
present much risk to patients. 83 FDA is actively reevaluating its regulatory
approach to AI and machine learning functions that are intended for use in
the care, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, leaving some
uncertainty as to what future regulation will look like.
We do not mean to suggest that the agency is absent-even where it
leaves unregulated spaces, the contours of those spaces shape the actions of
health systems and insurers in developing the technologies noted above.
Nevertheless, the overall picture is one of lower regulatory hurdles for
medical AI, particularly when it is developed and deployed by user
innovators. This is important because high regulatory costs might otherwise
favor seller innovators who can spread those costs over a larger market of
consumers of standardized products and disadvantage user innovators who
develop customized products for their own use. 84

1. The Limits ofFDA 's Regulatory Authority
FDA has never had comprehensive authority to regulate all new medical
technologies, and much biomedical innovation has routinely happened in
the course of activities that are beyond FDA' s reach. By long tradition, FDA
does not regulate the practice of medicine, including innovative new uses
82.
FDA-Approved A.I.-Based Algorithms, MED. FUTURIST, https://medicalfuturist.com/fdaapproved-ai-based-algorithms/ (https://perma.cc/8AEN-4CR9).
83.
See, e.g., OFF. NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., FDASIA HEALTH IT
REPORT: PROPOSED STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RISK-BASED FRAMEWORK 3-4 (2014),
https://www.fda.gov/media/87886/download [https://perma.cc/LQY9-YUGK).
84.
See Andrew W. Torrance & Eric von Hippe!, The Right to Innovate, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV.
793.
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by physicians of products that were previously approved or cleared as safe
and effective for other purposes. 85 Health care providers have always played
an important role in biomedical innovation as they learn by doing, 86 giving
critical feedback and suggestions for improvements to firms that develop
regulated products as well as continuously improving unregulated
technologies such as surgical techniques. 87
The FDCA only applies to products that are introduced, delivered, or
received in interstate commerce, an important limitation that may exclude
many user innovations. 88 Many of the technologies that we consider in this
paper are developed and used within institutions like health systems that do
not sell them to others or otherwise make them available in commerce. 89 As
a result, information technology products developed within a health care
institution without the use of components derived from commerce, and used
only internally to analyze the institution's own data, are arguably beyond
the constitutional and statutory limits of FDA regulation. Lawyers have
certainly made this argument regarding FDA's authority to regulate
laboratory-developed diagnostic tests, which are also developed and
deployed within a particular health care institution. 90 However, courts have
also upheld FDA's regulatory authority in arguably similar circumstances. 91
85.
See 21 U.S.C. § 396 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient
for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship."); Wendy
Teo, FDA and the Practice of Medicine: Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41 SETON HALL LEGJS. J. 305
(2017). But see Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 427 (2015) (arguing the distinction between medical products and the practice of medicine is
indistinct).
86.
Richard R. Nelson, Kristin Buterbaugh, Marcel Perl & Annetine Gelijns, How Medical
Know-How Progresses, 40 RsCH. POL'Y 1339(2011).
87.
See Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, The Dynamics of Technological Change in
Medicine, 13 HEALTH AFFS. 28 ( 1994).
88.
21 U.S.C. § 331; see also§ 32l(b) ("The term "interstate commerce means (1) commerce
between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of
Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with a legislative body."). Although health and
safety regulation is traditionally relegated to the states, the limitation of prohibited activities to interstate
commerce gave Congress authority to enact the legislation under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution:
"The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3.
89.
These changes in the types of technological innovation taking place over time-moving from
a "product" paradigm to a "practice" paradigm, as Professor Nathan Cortez has framed it-challenge
FDA's ability to rely on older statutes to address newer issues. Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data
in Health Care, 14.1 1/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO SOC'Y 61, 72-73 (2017).
90.
PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. TRJBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, AS THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 10 (2015),
https://www .acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/0 I /Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15. pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DAC-SLAP].
91.
United States v. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming
jurisdiction of FDA to enforce FDCA against medical practice that treated patients with a mixture of
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Another limitation on FDA's authority in this context is that not all of
the AI technologies considered in this paper are likely to fit within the broad
statutory definition of "device":
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant,
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is ... intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals ....92
This definition, which covers a broad range of health care products from
simple bandages and tongue depressors to complex cardiac pacemakers,9 3
nonetheless might be read to exclude software to improve the efficiency of
health system staffing operations. On the other hand, an algorithm that
predicts which patients are at heightened risk of developing a C. diff.
infection and selects some patients for closer monitoring seems clearly to
be "intended for use ... in the care, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man." 94
Congress further limited the definition of device in the 21 st Century
Cures Act (Cures Act), 95 to exclude five specified "software functions," 96
mesenchymal stem cells extracted from the patients with an antibiotic that had been shipped in interstate
commerce); see also United States. v. U.S. Stem Cell Clinic, LLC, 403 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1283, 1298
n.11, 1300 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 2019), afj'd, 998 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming jurisdiction of
FDA to enforce FDCA against clinic performing stem cell therapies using reagents purchased from out
of state).
92.
§ 32l(h). In 2016 Congress added an explicit exclusion for "software functions excluded
pursuant to section 360j(o)."
93.
The statute further divides this broad category into different classes with increasing
regulatory controls based on the degree of risk they pose. § 360c. Other statutory language includes in
the definition of "device" an article which is "(I) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the
United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them," or "(3) intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals." § 32 l(h). The AI technologies considered in this paper
are unlikely to meet either of these alternative prongs of the device definition.
94.
§321(h).
95.
Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
96.
Cures Act§ 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o). As amended, the statute excludes from
the definition of device a software function that is intended
(A) for administrative support of a health care facility ... ; (B) for maintaining or encouraging
a healthy lifestyle ... ; (C) to serve as electronic patient records ... so long as - (i) such records
were created, stored, transferred, or reviewed by health care professionals, or by individuals
working under supervision of such professionals ... ; (D) for transferring, storing, converting
formats, or displaying clinical laboratory test or other device data and results ... unless such
function is intended to interpret or analyze clinical laboratory test or other device data, results,
and findings; or (E) ... for the purpose of (i) displaying, analyzing, or printing medical
information about a patient or other medical information ... ; (ii) supporting or providing
recommendations to a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a
disease or condition; and (iii) enabling such health care professional to independently review
the basis for such recommendations that such software presents ...
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while generally preserving FDA's traditional authority to regulate products
intended for use in the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease. 97
Some of the functions recited in these exclusions, such as "administrative
support of a healthcare facility," would not likely have been regulated as
medical devices even prior to the Cures Act because they fall outside the
"intended use" limitation in the statute. 98 Others, such as maintaining or
encouraging a healthy lifestyle, involve functions of low enough risk that
FDA previously indicated it would decline to regulate them as a matter of
enforcement discretion. 99 Although these functions are now presumptively
excluded from the statutory definition of device, Congress gave FDA
authority to regulate them as devices if it makes a finding "that use of such
software function would be reasonably likely to have serious adverse health
consequences." 100
Two exclusions, described in subsections (D) and (E) of the Cures Act
software provisions, potentially curtail regulation of traditional software
that might otherwise have been covered by the broad statutory definition of
device, but they generally leave intact regulatory authority over more
complex medical AI. Subsection (D) excludes software functions that
transfer, store, convert formats, or display data, "unless such function is
intended to interpret or analyze" the data, in which case it remains subject
to regulation as a medical device. 101 Under FDA's interpretation, this
provision allows FDA to regulate software that allocates health system
resources to those patients with the most urgent needs:
For example, if a software function is intended to prioritize patients
in an Intensive Care Unit based on their clinical status, then this
function is intended to interpret or analyze device data, results and
Id.
Congress also amended the statutory definition of "device" to cross-reference these exclusions. See
supra note 92.
97.
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
98.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
99.
See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHANGES TO EXISTING MEDICAL SOFTWARE
POLICIES RESULTING FROM SECTION 3060 OF THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 6-7 (2019) [hereinafter CURES ACT
CHANGES GUIDANCE] (previous guidance indicating that FDA intended to exercise enforcement
discretion to refrain from regulating certain medical mobile applications designed to promote general
fitness and wellness for individuals would be modified to indicate that these applications no longer meet
the definition of "device"); id. at 8-1 I (previous guidance indicating that FDA intended to exercise
enforcement discretion for software functions that enable individuals to interact with their own electronic
health records would be modified to indicate that these functions no longer meet the definition of
"device").
100. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A). Notification of the finding and proposed order must be published
in the Federal Register with an opportunity for public comment for at least thirty days before it becomes
final. § 360j(o )(3)(8).
101. § 360j(o)(3)(D).
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findings and is, therefore, not excluded from the definition of device.
102

Many forms of AI technology described in this article would seem to
remain subject to regulation under this interpretation.
Subsection (E) provides a potentially broader exclusion for clinical
decision support (CDS) software for the use of health care professionals,
but it appears not to apply to opaque recommendations derived from
complex AI algorithms. 103 This exclusion covers some software functions
that analyze data and that provide recommendations to a health care
professional about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or
condition, 104 but only if it is intended to be sufficiently transparent to enable
a health care professional "to independently review the basis for such
recommendations . . . so that it is not the intent that such health care
professional rely primarily on any of such recommendations to make a
clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual patient." 105
As FDA explains in recent draft guidance, this criterion requires disclosure
of underlying data and the logic or rationale used by an algorithm in making
a recommendation to qualify for exclusion:
In order to describe the basis for a recommendation, regardless of the
complexity of the software and whether or not it is proprietary, the
software developer should describe the underlying data used to
develop the algorithm and should include plain language descriptions
of the logic or rationale used by an algorithm to render a
recommendation. . . . A practitioner would be unable to
independently evaluate the basis of a recommendation, and therefore
would be primarily relying upon it, if the recommendation were
based on information whose meaning could not be expected to be
independently understood by the intended HCP user (e.g., the inputs
used to generate the recommendation are not identified). 106
At least some health care systems are working to align their AI products
102.
103.

CURES ACT CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note 99, at 13.
§ 360j(o)(l)(E). FDA draft guidance explains:

Products that acquire an image or physiological signal from the body, or from a sample
from the body, or that process or analyze such information, or both, have been regulated for
many years as devices when such acquisition, processing, or analyzing is intended for a purpose
identified in the statutory device definition.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 10 (2019) [hereinafter CDS DRAFT
GUIDANCE].

104.
105.
I 06.

§ 360j(o)(!)(E)(i), (ii).
§ 360j(o)(l)(E)(iii).
CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note I 03, at 12.
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with this criterion to avoid regulation. In the case of Sepsis Watch, discussed
above in Part II, "[ c ]linicians were instructed to put the model output into
context with other relevant information to confirm or dismiss a sepsis
diagnosis. The machine learning model did not drive clinical care in a
standalone manner." 107 The developers behind the tool reported that they
"worked closely with regulatory officials to ensure that Sepsis Watch
qualified as CDS and was not a diagnostic medical device." 108
Commentators have criticized this statutory criterion and FDA's
interpretations. 109 The criterion may be difficult or impossible to satisfy for
sophisticated AI software that continuously learns from new data and makes
recommendations based on ever-changing algorithms that are opaque to
users. Even when transparency is technically possible, it may require
disclosure of valuable proprietary data and algorithms, thus forcing
innovators to choose between avoiding regulation and preserving trade
secrecy.

2. Enforcement Discretion and Its Limits
In addition to statutory limits on what FDA can regulate, FDA
sometimes exercises discretion to relieve innovators from the burdens of
regulation for relatively small-scale activities. For example, when Congress
gave FDA authority to regulate in vitro diagnostic devices as medical
devices in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 11 FDA exercised
discretion to refrain from enforcement for laboratory developed tests
(LDTs) that are designed, manufactured, and used within a single
laboratory. 111 This limitation significantly reduces costs for some user
innovators, although at the social cost of reducing regulatory oversight of
health and safety. Initially these laboratories were small and local, but as the
industry and technology evolved, the entities taking advantage of
enforcement discretion became larger and provided testing services on a
national and even international scale. 112
Eventually FDA issued draft guidance proposing to exercise greater

°

107. Sendak et al., supra note 33, at 5.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173,
1220-22 (2014); Barbara J. Evans & Pilar Ossorio, The Challenge of Regulating Clinical Decision
Support Software After 21st Century Cures, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 244-50 (2018); Efthimios Parasidis,
Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal Framework, 20 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'Y
183, 191-208 (2019).
110. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
111. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES, FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LOTS) 5-7 (2014).
112. Id. at 7-8.
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oversight of some LDTs under a risk-based approach that would increase
oversight as necessary to protect patient safety. 113 FDA decided against
issuing final guidance for the regulation of LDTs in the fmal days of the
Obama Administration 114 (though the laboratories themselves remain
subject to regulation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) under a different statute). 115 But the absence of binding guidance
does not compel FDA to continue a policy of enforcement discretion.
Meanwhile, some laboratories have sought premarket approval or clearance
for LDTs, perhaps to signal quality or to secure insurance coverage for their
tests. 116
FDA recognized the complex effects of enforcement discretion on
innovation in summing up the competing views expressed in reactions to its
Draft Guidance on LDTs:
While excessive oversight can discourage innovation, inadequate and
inconsistent oversight in which different test developers are treated
differently can also discourage innovation by making it difficult for
high-quality test developers to compete with poorer performing
counterparts . . . When patients and providers discover that results
they relied upon to make treatment and/or diagnostic decisions were
inaccurate, their confidence in laboratory testing may be
compromised ... Appropriately tailored oversight can facilitate the
development of analytically and clinically valid tests and the
generation of the evidence health care providers and patients need to
113. Id.
114. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMrN., DISCUSSION PAPER ON LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS
(LDTs) (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/102367/download [https://perma.cc/7CRW-GX24]
[hereinafter DISCUSSION LDTS].
115. CMS administers the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), and clinical
laboratories must obtain certificates of compliance or accreditation under CLIA in order to receive
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for the testing services they provide. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
CUA,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA
[https://perma.cc/HN7U-UTMZ]. CLIA primarily regulates laboratories and their procedures, requiring
labs to "meet requirements relating to the proper collection, transportation, and storage of specimens,"
42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(l)(A), and to "use only personnel meeting such qualifications as the Secretary may
establish," id. at § 263a(f)(I )(C), among other things. But CLIA regulations do impose some
requirements on the analytical validity of tests themselves, by requiring laboratories to engage in
proficiency testing and to set specifications for their tests' accuracy, precision, and reportable ranges. 42
C.F.R. § 493.1253(b) (2021). See also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the
Future ofPersonalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1891-94 (2016).
116. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Opting into Device Regulation in the Face of Uncertain Paten/ability,
23 MARQUETTE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. I (2019). Laboratories performing diagnostic testing for COVID19 may want their LDTs to receive FDA authorization, which allows those firms to receive legal
immunity under emergency preparedness laws. Steve Usdin, FDA to Stop Reviewing COVID-19 Lab
Tests, Raising Concerns in Congress, BIOCENTURY (Oct. 7, 2020, 8:24 PM),
https://www.biocentury.com/article/630971 /fda-to-stop-reviewing-covid-19-lab-tests-raisingconcems-in-congress [https://perma.cc/UY4Q-F697].
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make well-informed decisions. 117
Similar competing considerations inform FDA's contemplation of how
to regulate AI and machine learning systems. The agency will face one set
of potential concerns if the technology is "locked" prior to marketing so that
the algorithm will always provide the same result in response to the same
input. 118 In such a case, the algorithm might not be tailored to provide
accurate responses for critical subpopulations, or more generally might be
poorly fitted to determine the true relationship between its inputs and its
outputs. 119 But the agency would face different challenges if it permitted an
algorithm to change as it learns from new data generated in the course of
further experience. 120 This feature makes premarket regulation problematic
as a mechanism for quality oversight. At what point in the lifecycle of a
continuously changing algorithm is it time for further regulatory review?
FDA has proposed for discussion a "total product lifecycle" approach to
regulation-which may require additional statutory authority-that relies
heavily on manufacturer vigilance and best practices to provide reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness of products that change over tirne. 121
FDA has worked with regulators in other countries under the auspices of the
International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to develop this
approach and to harmonize expectations for the regulatory treatment of
these technologies in order to promote patient safety while fostering
innovation. 122 As envisioned, regulators or third party evaluators would
assess the culture of quality and organizational excellence of a particular
company in a precertification program to ensure that manufacturers will
monitor their devices to continually manage patient risks throughout the
117. See DISCUSSION LOTS, supra note 114, at 1-2.
118. While locked algorithms provide the same outputs given the same input, inputs change as the
real world does, which can degrade algorithm performance over time. Sharon E. Davis, Thomas A.
Lasko, Guanhua Chen, Edward D. Siew & Michael E. Matheny, Calibration Drift in Regression and
Machine Learning Models for Acute Kidney Injury, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 1052, 1053
(2017).
119. See Boris Babic, Sara Gerke, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn Cohen, Algorithms on
Regulatory Lockdown in Medicine, 366 SCI. 1202, 1202-03 (2019).
120. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A
MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMO): DISCUSSION PAPER AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK (2019) [hereinafter
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATION~].
121. /d.atl,6,7-14.
122. See INT'L MED. DEVICE REGULATOR'S F., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMO): KEY
DEFINITIONS (2013), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-keydefinitions-140901.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS7L-B8U5]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE AS A
MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMO): CLINICAL EVALUATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/software-medical-device-samd-clinical-evaluation
[https://perma.cc/YUC2MDK4].
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product lifecycle. 123 FDA would conduct premarket review for those
devices that require it, establish clear expectations for manufacturers to
continually manage patient risks throughout the product lifecycle, and
require ongoing postmarket performance reporting and transparency. 124
Product changes that change the intended use would require a new
premarket submission. 125 Although the plan has not yet been finalized, FDA
reaffirmed its approach in January 2021. 126
By reducing the regulatory burden on incremental product changes, this
approach would permit software firms to perform their own quality
oversight as they continually update their products. But the focus on
company culture may offer less relief to new AI user innovators such as
health systems and insurers that do not have the same history of exercising
quality oversight over software products that seller innovators can
demonstrate.

3. Implications for Medical Al
The regulatory implications for the technologies considered in this article
are mixed. Some software functions-including "back office"
administrative tasks such as billing and insurance reimbursement, general
wellness and healthy lifestyle support, and electronic health records-may
be categorically excluded from regulation as devices, although the
boundaries of the excluded categories may be blurry enough to encourage
prior consultation with FDA to be sure. Even for categorically excluded
software functions, the Cures Act gives FDA authority to override the
exclusion by finding that it is "reasonably likely to have serious adverse
health consequences." 127
AI technologies that pertain more directly to diagnosis and treatment of
patients will likely continue to meet the statutory definition of devices,
although FDA might choose to regulate them with a light touch. The FDCA
gives FDA considerable flexibility to classify medical devices into three

123. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: A
WORKJNG
MODEL;
V.1
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download
[https://perma.cc/C8TZ-E5VW]; see also Rachel E. Sachs, Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37
YALEJ. ON REG. 219,248 (2020).
124. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS, supra note 120, at 12-15.
125. Id. at 11-12.
126. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Releases Artificial Intelligence/Machine
Leaming Action Plan (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdareleases-artificial-intelligencemachine-1eaming-action-plan [https://perma.ccN476-4CTP].
127. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A)(i); see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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different risk categories with different levels of regulatory controls. 128 FDA
may also exercise enforcement discretion rather than exercising its full
authority to regulate some devices that it believes pose low risk to the
public. 129 For example, FDA recently stated in draft guidance that it does
not intend to enforce compliance with the applicable device requirements
of the FDCA for CDS functions intended to inform clinical management for
non-serious situations or conditions, even when health care providers are
unable to independently review the basis for the recommendation. 130
Discretionary forbearance from regulation under circumstances specified in
nonbinding guidance documents may impress upon innovators a lurking
possibility of regulation, allowing FDA to monitor new technologies
informally without expending the administrative resources necessary for
premarket approval or clearance of every product.
These provisions leave considerable uncertainty as to whether and how
far FDA will assert regulatory authority, making it advisable for innovators
to consult with FDA to avoid surprises. For some innovations, such as the
Duke Sepsis Watch System, developers are doing just that. 131 When
innovators work closely with regulatory officials as they design their
products, FDA has an opportunity to oversee and guide product
development, and perhaps to decide that the product requires a more robust
process of premarket clearance or approval. (And, to the extent that
companies' involvement with FDA may lead the agency to establish
regulatory barriers for other entrants to surmount, they may have
anticompetitive effects as well.) Other innovators, however, have described
little to no interaction with FDA officials. 132 These include health systems
128. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. Class I devices pose the lowest risk and are subject to the lowest level of
regulatory controls, with increasing levels of regulatory controls for the higher risk devices in Class II
and Class III. See Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/overviewdevice-regulation [https://perma.cc/3VMN-YEME].
129. E.g., CDS DRAIT GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 16 (indicating when FDA intends to exercise
enforcement discretion for low-risk software functions intended to provide clinical decision support).
See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOITWARE FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE
MEDICAL APPLICATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 2
(Sept. 27, 2019) ("[T]he FDA intends to apply its regulatory oversight to only those software functions
that are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patient's safety if the device were
to not function as intended.").
130. Id. at 16--17, 20-21. Examples in the draft guidance of functions that are intended to inform
clinical management for non-serious situations or conditions include a machine-learning algorithm for
which the logic and inputs are not explained that alerts health care providers to triggers that may indicate
cholesterol management issues.
131. Sendak et al., supra note 33, at 6.
132. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Head of an Academic Medical Center's Machine
Leaming Program (Dec. 30, 2020); E-mail from Anonymous Member of a Major Academic Medical
Center's Machine-Leaming Implementation Committee (Aug. 24, 2020) (on file with author).
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with actively running AI systems that make predictions and
recommendations about patient care. 133
In sum, the weight of FDA regulation of medical AI, as felt by
innovators, appears to be fairly light-at least relative to the regulation of
other medical devices. The landscape is complex, and developers of medical
AI technologies intended for patient care face considerable uncertainty
about whether and to what extent FDA will regulate these technologies as
medical devices. The FDCA allows leeway for FDA to determine the
appropriate level of regulatory controls for different devices depending on
its assessment of the risks they present. FDA may nonetheless refrain from
regulating some of these technologies, at least for now. In the face of
uncertainty, some innovators may consult with FDA as they develop new
technologies, allowing FDA to maintain oversight and to guide product
development in ways that give it considerable control to mitigate patient
risks.

B. Patent Law
Patents are typically considered an important incentive for biomedical
innovation by product sellers. In theory, patent law provides a unitary
system of legal rights for inventions in all fields of technology. 134 In
practice, some industries rely on patents more heavily than others, 135 and
courts and legislatures have adapted in a variety of ways. 136 The
pharmaceutical industry consistently reports that patent incentives are
essential to its willingness to invest in new drug development, while the
story is more mixed in other fields. 137
In medical AI, patents may be both less necessary and less powerful133. Id.
134. Indeed, members of the World Trade Organization may now be required to apply the same
rules of patent law to all fields under Article 27(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (TRIPS Agreement).
135. Luigi Orsenigo & Valerio Sterzio, Comparative Study of the Use of Patents in Different
Industries (Knowledge, Internationalization & Tech. Stud., Universita Bocconi, Working Paper No.
33/2010,
2010)
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luigi_Orsenigo/publication/254400700_
Comparative_Study_of_the_Use_of_patents _in_Different_Industries/links/00b4953a2d l 294b2e40000
00.pdf.
136. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003).
13 7. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The Importance of Patents to Innovation: Updated
Cross-Industry Comparisons with Biopharmaceuticals, 25 EXPERT OP. ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 739
(2015); Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value ofSoftware Patents, 39 RSCH. POL'Y
994 (2009); Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1286 (2009).
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and at least anecdotally, carry accordingly less weight in the innovation
decisions of some user innovators. 138 They may be less necessary than in
other biomedical innovation because AI systems and the data underlying
them are often comparatively easy to protect through trade secrecy. In
addition, to the extent that AI systems--especially those developed inhouse-are truly bespoke innovations that respond to location-specific
problems and would not fit other users, there may be little risk of free-riding
by competitors, removing a classic justification for patents and making them
less necessary. 139
Patents are less powerful in this context for more complex reasons.
Although many firms are pursuing patents on medical applications of AI
and ML throughout the world, 140 the patent eligibility of these inventions
under U.S. law is nonetheless in some doubt in light ofrecent case law. 141
Some scholars have also argued more broadly that aspects of patent doctrine
(such as requirements for nonobviousness and disclosure) make it a poor fit
for AI, 142 while others argue that the patent system can adapt as it has done
before for other new technologies. 143 The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(PTO) has recently reaffirmed its commitment to Al-related IP rights. 144
Nevertheless, in an environment of uncertainty, patents appear to provide
weaker incentives for medical AI innovation.

138. Telephone Interview with Yindalon Aphinyanaphongs, Dir., Clinical Predictive Analytics at
NYU Langone Health, (Aug. l 0, 2020); Telephone Interview with Mark Sendak, Population Health &
Data Sci. Lead, Duke Inst. For Health Innovation (July 19, 2021 ).
139. Cf Kevin Emerson Collins, Copyright and the Customization Effect, 56 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 197 (2021) (arguing that customized creative production needs less intellectual property
protection).
140. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 2019:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE l 3-14 (2019) (noting that Al-related patenting is growing rapidly, with
machine learning patent filings increasing at an average annual rate of28% since 2013 and using patent
data analytics to identify research trends in AI); Howard Read, Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning in Healthcare: An Intellectual Property Perspective, APPLEYARD LEES (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.appleyardlees.com/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-leaming-in-healthcare/
[https://perma.cc/67BP-AGJP] (noting a "surge in filings of patent applications by companies that have
not traditionally been associated with the healthcare sector" such as Google, Microsoft, and Apple).
14 l. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566
U.S. 66 (2012); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Int'I, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
142. E.g., Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Data-Centric Technologies: Patents and Copyright Doctrinal
Disruptions, 43 NOVA L. REV. 287(2019).
143. E.g., Dan L. Burk, AI Patents and the Self-Assembling Machine, 105 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 301 (2021).
144. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., PUBLIC VIEWS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
POLICY
I
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_Al-Report_2020-10-07 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8RN-PVMP].
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1. Patent Eligibility
Four decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014
revived and extended long dormant judicial limitations on patentable
subject matter for "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas." 145 Two decisions in particular have created uncertainty as to the
patent eligibility of inventions in two fields that converge in medical AI:
medical diagnostics and computer software. 146
In Mayo v. Prometheus, 147 the unanimous Court relied on the "laws of
nature" exclusion to invalidate a patent on a method of optimizing treatment
with a drug by measuring drug metabolite levels in a patient's serum and
comparing them to specified reference values to determine the need to
adjust the dosage. 148 The Court reasoned that the underlying relationship
was a law of nature, and that the patent's other claim elements
(administering the drug and measuring metabolite levels in a patient) did
not add enough to make the process patent-eligible. 149
Two years later, in Alice v. CLS Bank, 150 the Court relied on the exclusion
for "abstract ideas" to invalidate a patent on a computer-implemented
method for mitigating settlement risk in a transaction. 151 The Court set forth
a two-step patent eligibility test (the Alice/Mayo test): (1) is the claim
directed to one of the judicial exclusions; and (2) if so, is there "an
'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself?"' 152
145. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82. See also Bilski, 561 U.S. 593; Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. 576;
Alice, 573 U.S. 208. The revived limitations claim authority from a number of older decisions including
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Cf Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A
Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH 647, 669 (2015) (characterizing recent
decisions as the Court "tum[ing] its back on the traditional framework for patent eligibility" that "drew
the boundary of patent-eligibility at practical application" in favor of a new requirement of "inventive
application.").
146. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Mennell & David 0. Taylor, Final Report of the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33
BERK.ELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 581-591 (2018) (summarizing views expressed at a workshop including
industry representatives, legal practitioners, legal scholars, and policymakers); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015).
147. 566U.S.at66.
148. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Mar. 12, 2002).
149. 566 U.S. at 72.
150. 573 U.S. at 208.
15 I. U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed Oct. 19, 1999).
152. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). Critics say this test improperly
conflates patent eligibility with satisfaction of patent law standards and creates considerable uncertainty
as to the types of inventions that are patent eligible, particularly in the life sciences and information
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Lower courts applying this test have invalidated hundreds of previously
issued patents in recent years, 153 often ruling on patent eligibility as a matter
oflaw at the outset oflitigation without developing an evidentiary record. 154
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") and the
PTO have largely fallen in line behind the approach of the Supreme Court,
although sometimes with explicit disagreement and lament. 155 The result
has been considerable uncertainty as to what remains patent eligible in the
fields of software, business methods, and medical diagnostics. 156 As many
patents are struck down, patent lawyers and agents learn to draft around
revitalized exclusions, 157 and the Federal Circuit and PTO consider
arguments to narrow the exclusions. 158 In this environment it is difficult to
technology. Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of "An Unpatentable Abstract Idea", 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A
Need for Housecleaning in the Law ofPatentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765 (2014);
Eisenberg, supra note 146.
153. Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years of Case Law Since
Alice
v.
CLS
Bank:
Part
I,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Aug.
29,
2019),
https ://www.ipwatchdog.com/20 I 9/08/2 9/al ice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-analyzing-five-years-ofcase-law-s ince-al ice-v-c ls-bank-part-i/id= 112 722/ [https://perma.cc/QBH5-QCYV].
154. For a thoughtful and comprehensive review of recent cases, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, The
Procedure ofPatent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 581-91 (2018) (finding that courts often invalidate
patent for lack of patentable subject matter at the pleading stage without developing an evidentiary
record).
155. Disagreement and lament appear in multiple opinions from members of the Federal Circuit
concurring or dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane in Athena Diagnostics v. Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2019) (denying rehearing en bane in Athena
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). See, e.g., Athena,
927 F.3d at 1335 (opinion of Lourie, J., joined by Reyna & Chen J.J., concurring in the denial of the
petition for rehearing en bane) ("!fl could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to patent
eligibility, as respects natural laws, only claims directed to the natural law itself ... I would not exclude
uses or detection of natural laws ... But we do not write here on a clean slate; we are bound by Supreme
Court precedent."); id. at I 337 (opinion of Hughes, J., joined by Prost, C.J. & Taranto, J., concurring in
the denial of the petition for rehearing en bane) ("! agree that the language in Mayo, as later reinforced
in Alice, forecloses this court from adopting an approach or reaching a result different from the panel
majority's. I also agree, however, that the bottom line for diagnostics patents is problematic. But this is
not a problem that we can solve. As an inferior appellate court, we are bound by the Supreme Court.").
156. Lefstin, Mennell & Taylor, supra note 146; Shahrokh Falati, Patent Eligibility of Disease
Diagnosis, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 63 (2020); David 0. Taylor, 'Amending Patent Eligibility', 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 2149 (2017); Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years
of Case Law Since Alice v. CLS Bank: Part JI, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 3, 2019),
https ://www. ipwatchdog.com/2019/09 /03/al ice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-analyzing-five-years-ofcase-law-s ince-al ice-v-c ls-bank-part-ii/id=lI2769 / [https://perma.cc/4PZM-GXGW]; Mateo Aboy,
Cristina Crespo, Kathleen Liddell, Timo Minssen & Johnathan Liddicoat, Mayo's Impact on Patent
Applications Related to Biotechnology, Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 37 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 513, 514-16 (2019).
157. Mateo Aboy et al., One Year After Vanda, Are Diagnostics Patents Transforming into
Methods of Treatment to Overcome Mayo-Based Rejections?, 3 8 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 279, 28 I 82 (2020).
158. The Federal Circuit and the PTO continue to consider arguments to apply the Alice/Mayo
two-part test narrowly. See, e.g., Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'! Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117
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assess with confidence the patent eligibility of medical AI inventions-but
it is straightforward to conclude that patents on medical AI face real
challenges in meeting this requirement. 159

2. Patent Disclosure Requirements
Beyond the threshold issue of patent eligibility, medical AI innovators
may have difficulty satisfying patent law requirements for an enabling
disclosure of how to make and use the invention, a written description of
the invention, and claims that particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention. 160 Adequately enabling an AI system should be possible, whether
through a complex written document for transparent systems or potentially
through depositing data and algorithms for opaque systems. 161 But because
the scope of enablement limits the scope of allowable patent rights, the
resulting patent might be quite narrow if it is difficult to generalize beyond
the very specific example that has been disclosed. 162 Opaque algorithms
present similar challenges for satisfying the requirements of written
description and claim definiteness: even when it is possible to state in words
what the algorithm is, it may be challenging to claim it in broad enough
terms for the patent to have commercial value. 163
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of patent law, even when
possible, has another notable downside for medical AI innovators:
disclosure of data and algorithms may destroy more effective protection for
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (claims reciting method of treatment based on results of diagnostic test are not excluded
from patent eligibility notwithstanding that treatment steps are conventional), cerl. petition filed, call for
views of solicitor general sub nom. Hikma Phanns. v. Vanda Pharms. (Mar. 18, 2019); cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 911 (2020); Nat. Alts. Int'!, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(method of treatment claims patent eligible even though method uses natural products and treatment
steps involve conventional, well-known activity). The Supreme Court has resisted pleas to revisit patent
subject matter eligibility, Hikma Phanns Inc. v. Vanda Phanns., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020); HP v.
Berkheimer, 140 S. Ct. 911 (Mem) (2020). Though the Solicitor General has noted that recent cases
"have fostered substantial uncertainty" and that "[t]he confusion created by this Court's recent Section
101 precedents warrants review in an appropriate case." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 8, Hikma Phanns. v. Vanda Phanns., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020) (No. 18-817)
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18817/124768/20191206151701002_ l 8-817%20-%20Hikma%20-%20CVSG%20-%20v28.pdf
[https://penna.cc/CB6A-R4BB).
159. Mateo Ahoy et al., How Does Emerging Patent Case Law in the US and Europe Affect
Precision Medicine?, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1118, 1121 (2019).
160. 35 U.S.C. § l 12(a), (b).
161. W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future ofMedicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1401, 1427-32 (2015); See also Burk, supra note 143, at 2 ("[I)n many cases the solutions developed
for the patenting of biotechnological inventions appear to provide ready answers to the concerns raised
regarding patents and AI technologies.").
162. Price, supra note 161, at 1429.
163. Id. at 1430-32.
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these innovations as trade secrets. 164 Firms can and do keep data and
algorithms secret in a way that is more difficult in the context of prescription
drugs or physical devices, which may be vulnerable to reverse-engineering
once they are made available to the public. Trade secret law provides
remedies for misappropriation of economically valuable secret
information. 165 Access to data and control oflarge datasets has considerable
competitive value for AI innovators, an advantage they might well hesitate
to surrender in exchange for patent rights of uncertain validity and scopeparticularly for user innovators who do not require patents to benefit from
using the innovation themselves and do not plan to sell it to a broader
market.
Taken together, these doctrinal challenges reduce the power of the patent
system as an incentive for innovation in medical AI-at least, relative to
that system's power in other areas of biomedical innovation such as drugs
and conventional medical devices. 166 Patents are more difficult to obtain, of
more doubtful validity when granted, and more likely to cover relatively
narrow inventions. We do not claim that patents are unavailable or that the
incentives are negligible; indeed, commercial firms have filed many
applications for patents on inventions involving medical AI. Our point is
simply that patent protection is more uncertain for this technology, and thus
that patents are less powerful shapers of innovation incentives. But the
insecurity of patent protection is more likely to matter to seller innovators
whose profit expectations depend on sales to a broader market of consumers
than to user innovators who are adequately motivated to innovate by the
expected benefits of using a customized innovation themselves.
C. Insurance Reimbursement

A third innovation policy lever that plays a different and diminished role
in the AI space is insurance reimbursement. In most of the examples
described in Part II, AI innovators will have difficulty obtaining direct
reimbursement for the use of their AI technology from insurers, whether
public (such as Medicare and Medicaid) or private. 167 To be clear, as noted
in Part II, some AI tools may make health care delivery more efficient and
164. Id. at 1432-36.
165. Id.
166. As noted above, the biomedical industry is not the only relevant baseline; incentives provided
by patents for medical AI may more closely resemble those for software more generally, where patents
have long been of questionable value. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation
in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. I, 5---6 (2001); Graham et al., supra note 137, at 1262.
167. For some explicitly diagnostic AI technologies, insurance reimbursement may be available.
However, those technologies are not the focus of this Article. They are much more likely to fit into the
classic medical device paradigm and likely also are subject to FDA review.
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enable providers to earn revenue on that basis, perhaps by collecting more
insurance reimbursements for treating more patients. But the lack of direct
reimbursement for the innovation itself distinguishes these AI innovations
from traditional health care technologies like pharmaceuticals or medical
devices. Manufacturers of typical new products can expect that their
products will be reimbursed by insurers-and the prospect of
reimbursement factors into innovation decisions. 168 Insurance will not
provide reimbursement for the cost of using the innovations we consider,
nor will reimbursement decisions provide quality oversight in this context.
Insurance reimbursement has not traditionally been recognized as part of
the innovation policy toolkit, but in recent years scholars have increased
their focus on insurance as a key driver of innovation incentives for health
care technologies. 169 Insurance reimbursement functions very much like an
innovation prize. 170 It is an ex post reward provided for the development of
an innovative medical technology, funded largely by public subsidies, and
reserves a relatively large role for the government or private insurers in
setting the size of the award. 171 Insurers' decisions to provide
reimbursement for a new drug or device create a market for that product,
and innovators respond by investing in the development of products that
they expect will find a ready market (in the form of insurance
reimbursement) once they make them available. 172
The creation of Medicare Part Dis an example of these dynamics. When
168. In the case of prescription drugs, insurers are often compelled by law to provide such
reimbursement. Rachel E. Sachs, De/inking Reimbursement, I 02 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2316-17 (2018).
169. See, e.g., Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 10, at 178; Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W.
Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 5
(2017); Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation
Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 105--07 (2020); Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology ofResistance: The
Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 645-55 (2010);
Arti K. Rai, The Ends ofIntellectual Property: Health as a Case Study, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,
128-29 (2007); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Re.framing the Debate, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999, 1012-13 (2014).
170. Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 10, at 178. See also generally, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, Peifecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne
Scotchmer,lntellectual Property: When ls It the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON.
51 (2002); see also Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 528 (2001) (cataloging the literature).
171. Daniel J. Heme] & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents -Prizes Debate, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 303, 307--08, 348 (2013).
172. These pressures are less acute for non-health goods, which typically require fewer resources
to develop in the first instance (as FDA review process is both costly and time consuming) and which
are typically inexpensive enough to enable consumers to purchase them directly. Americans might be
able to save up for a new or used smartphone-a one-time purchase costing several hundred dollarsbut cannot afford more than a million dollars per year for a lifesaving medication. See, e.g., Katie
Thomas & Reed Abelson, The $6 Million Drng Claim, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019),
https ://www.nytimes.com/20 19/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases. htm I [https ://perma.cc/2 WQQYEYL].
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Congress passed Medicare Part Din 2003, 173 it provided a prescription drug
benefit to many Medicare enrollees who had previously lacked coverage
entirely, or who had less comprehensive coverage. 174 As a result, Part D
expanded the potential market for pharmaceutical companies by both
increasing the number of seniors with the ability to pay for their products
and by increasing the prices that pharmaceutical companies could expect to
recoup on sales to seniors who previously had less remunerative
insurance. 175 Economists studying Part D found that after its passage,
pharmaceutical investment increased in drug classes with higher Medicare
market share. 176 Economists analyzing other market-creating policy
changes (such as particular coverage mandates) have found similar
results. 177
But direct insurance reimbursement is unlikely for these new AI
technologies. Some functions are not directly reimbursable at all, such as
AI systems that help schedule emergency rooms or reduce patient waiting
time. Risk predictors that are routinely run for all patients, such as predictors
of sepsis or readmission risk, are similarly unlikely to be directly billed or
reimbursable. Instead, they are more likely to be folded into overall facility
charges. Providers may nonetheless recover these costs diffusely, as they
seek reimbursement for the care they provide as a whole.
To be sure, there may be financial incentives to use new health care
technologies even without specific insurance reimbursement for them. AI
technologies that have the potential to increase clinical volume (or even the
explicit goal of doing so), such as the tool for reducing capacity strain from
Cedars-Sinai discussed in Part II, 178 would likely enable providers to earn
173. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). Part D was not created until
nearly forty years after the passage of the initial Medicare statute. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 368-70 (1982).
174. KAISER FAM. FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 2010 5 (May 2010) ("Prior to January
1, 2006, ... about one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and older, and one-third of poor (34%) and nearpoor (33%) seniors, had no drug coverage in 2003."); see also Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription
Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey, HEALTH AFFS. W5-l52, W5-160
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/04/19/hlthaff.w5. I 52.citation
[https://perma.cc/A627-CW5J].
175. Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be Negotiated Under Part D
of Medicare? And if so, How?, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 33, 34, 36--37 (2008).
176. See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare Part D on
Pharmaceutical R&D 12-13 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13857, 2008). But see
David Dranove, Craig Garthwaite & Manuel Hermosilla, Pharmaceutical Profits and the Social Value
of Innovation 6--7 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the
findings of Blume-Kohout and Sood by noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge).
177. See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the
Vaccine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527,528 (2004); Wesley Yin, Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1060, 1061 (2008).
178. See Thompson, supra note 42.
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more money for the increased services they provide, even if they would not
be able to bill directly for the use of the AI product. And some
administrative AI tools can increase insurance reimbursement for non-AI
services by scouring medical records for billable efforts or diagnoses that
may not have been coded for reimbursement. 179
Other forms of indirect financial incentives come from attempts to alter
payment methodologies to reimburse providers for the value, rather than the
volume, of the care they provide. Some are more formal: the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has been working to increase the amount
of its reimbursement that is based on quality or value, both in the hospital
setting and in the outpatient physician setting. 180 Prior to these and other
reforms, providers may have obtained more reimbursement if a patient
suffered an avoidable complication (such as a fall or certain hospitalacquired infections), as the providers could then bill for the treatment of that
complication on top of their earlier services. 181 But if providers can no
longer bill for treating complications like these---or if they even face
financial penalties for their occurrence-health systems may have greater
incentives to develop and adopt AI technologies that would reduce adverse
events, such as the Sepsis Watch program, 182 or UT Southwestem's
readmission risk predictor. 183 Some changes are informal: using AI
technology to improve efficiency or quality may provide leverage to
negotiate higher reimbursement rates for care. At least one health system
has been able to negotiate higher rates for office visits in part because its
predictive algorithms decrease the number of hospitalizations. 184
Although through these mechanisms the development of medical AI may
increase overall reimbursements to user innovators, these indirect
179. One hospital uses machine learning to identify un-coded reimbursable elements in electronic
health record notes and flags them for review by manual reviewers. Telephone Interview with
Anonymous Head of an Academic Medical Center's Machine Leaming Program (Dec. 30, 2020).
180. See, e.g., Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals-HHS Efforts to Improve
U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897,897 (2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., HHS to Deliver Value-Based Transformation in Primary Care (Apr. 22, 2019),
https ://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/04/22/hhs-del iver-value-based-trans fonnation-primarycare.html [https://penna.cc/6RNB-2ELD].
181. See, e.g., Teresa M. Waters et al., Effect of Medicare's Nonpayment/or Hospital-Acquired
Conditions: lessons for Future Policy, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 347 (2015).
182. Duke Today Staff, Duke Health licenses Technology Aimed to Reduce Sepsis in Hospitals,
DUKE TODAY MED. (July 3, 2019), https://today.duke.edu/2019/07 /duke-health-licenses-technologyaimed-reduce-sepsis-hospitals [https://penna.cc/9ZK8-C76BJ.
183. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
(HRRP) (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstrumentsNalue-Based-Programs/HRRP/Hospital-Readmission-Reduction-Program
[https://penna.cc/XJ47-R6Q2].
184. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Head of an Academic Medical Center's Machine
Leaming Program (Dec. 30, 2020).
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reimbursements are less amenable to manipulation by policymakers than
direct reimbursements. If policymakers want greater innovation in a certain
type of vaccine, for instance, they can precommit to reimburse that vaccine
at a higher rate to drive that innovation; this type of explicit, reimbursementdriven incentive structure, and its associated policy tools, is less prominent
for medical AI.
Another innovation-related benefit of insurance is also difficult to deploy
in this space: the role insurance plays in ensuring quality oversight of new
health products. Insurance companies often serve an important function as
independent evaluators of new medical technologies, demanding
information on the reasonable necessity of particular products before
agreeing to provide reimbursement for them. Even if laws require insurance
coverage, as they do for many payers in the case of new drugs, 185 insurers
may use information about drug effects to create preferred drug lists,
favoring some drugs over others, or to create prior authorization
requirements that impose additional administrative hurdles on physicians
and patients before they can obtain a particular product. 186
Insurers' quality oversight role is particularly important when FDA does
not require data from high quality studies as a condition of market access. 187
Although FDA review of new medical devices is far less stringent than
review of new drugs, insurers often demand that additional criteria are
met-beyond FDA authorization-before they will agree to cover a
particular product. 188 Insurer review may thus fill gaps in FDA's
information-forcing function for less regulated products. 189 But when FDA
oversight is weak or unlikely, and insurers are not directly reviewing AI
tools for possible reimbursement, there may be little to no external oversight
of the quality of these AI innovations.
In some cases, it will be readily apparent to the innovator even without
such oversight that an AI tool is not effective for its intended use. If sepsis
rates do not drop, or if thirty-day readmission rates are unchanged, a health
system may re-evaluate its approach for that AI product. But in other cases,
it may be more difficult to identify whether an AI tool is safe and effective.
Perhaps the tool does work to drive down the rate of the complication
185. Sachs, supra note 168, at 2309.
186. What ls Prior Authorization and How Does the Process Work?, CIGNA (2018),
https://www.cigna.com/individuals-families/understanding-insurance/what-is-prior-authorization
[https://perma.cc/f8J4-XU9B].
187. See supra Section III.A.
188. Nick Paul Taylor, CMS Rejects 1st Colorectal Cancer Blood Test, Tweaks Path for Exact,
Guardant and Others, HEALTHCAREDIVE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cmsrejects-l st-colorectal-cancer-blood-test-tweaks-path-for-exact-guarda/59365 7/
[https://perma.cc/TM7U-5VJU].
189. Eisenberg & Price II, supra note 65, at 3; Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 374.
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targeted by the algorithm-but with many false positives, leading many
patients to receive unnecessary treatment as a result. Or perhaps the tool
benefits some racial groups and not others. 190 A lack of direct insurance
reimbursement makes it much more difficult for insurers to meet these
needs for additional quality oversight.
III. IMPLICATIONS

The previous two parts have catalogued how user innovators face
substantially different incentives and development costs in the medical Al
context than seller innovators face for more familiar biomedical products
like traditional medical devices or drugs. Patents and insurance
reimbursement provide weaker incentives for these innovations. But
development costs and regulatory barriers to entry are lower as well. Many
of these medical AI innovations have been developed and used without
going through a potentially lengthy FDA approval or clearance process. Nor
do they require building new production facilities. Although assembling
data and informatics capacity can be expensive for some institutions, those
that have these resources at hand may develop and implement AI products
relatively inexpensively. Lower development costs make innovation a
reasonable investment even when expected benefits are also lower, and even
when benefits come primarily from internal efficiency improvements rather
than from external market sales. 191
This legal landscape may be especially advantageous for user innovation
by health systems and insurers. We consider three interconnected
implications for innovation processes. First, the availability and quality of
data impacts both who can innovate and the quality of their innovations.
Second, the products that result are often custom solutions to local
problems. Policy makers may have fewer tools for influencing these
innovations than they have for seller innovations designed for broader
markets, with possible implications for social welfare. Third, and finally,
these products face less oversight than do many biomedical products,
leading to the risk of quality problems that may be difficult to detect.

190. See Obermeyer et al., supra note 71.
191. An instructive parallel is laboratory-developed diagnostic tests. True, FDA exercises
enforcement discretion against the makers of laboratory-developed tests at least in part because those
tests were traditionally relatively simple. But it is also likely that some institutions are willing to develop
and use their own tests in reliance on enforcement discretion when that development might not be costeffective if coupled with an FDA clearance process. See supra text accompanying notes 110--117.

2022]

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

1163

A. Data Control
A substantial barrier to successful innovation in medical AI seems to be
the availability of high-quality data. AI requires large amounts of data, and
assembling, formatting, and curating data from multiple and heterogeneous
sources is an expensive task. 192 This gives an advantage to entities that
already possess substantial stores of data-among them large health
systems (especially academic medical centers) and health insurers. 193
Indeed, even those data-holders uninterested in developing their own
projects have gotten into the game. The Veterans Administration (VA),
while engaging in minimal internal AI projects for reasons including a lack
of expert programmers, has entertained many requests for collaboration and
tool-building, largely based on the value of its substantial longitudinal
dataset. 194 And insurers have used the lure of their data as a prize for
developers who create useful algorithms. 195 Although advantageous for
large health systems and insurers, the central role of data access can have
problematic implications.
For one thing, if in-house development relies on in-house data, only
some entities will have access to the very large datasets necessary for
training high-quality AI. They may be able to create solid products for their
own use (though the performance of single-system development even with
very large datasets may lag the performance that could be obtained from
training similar algorithms across multi-system data.) 196 Entities with
smaller datasets are more likely to introduce quality problems or biases into
resulting AI systems. A particularly dangerous middle ground includes
those entities that have sufficient data to plausibly create useful AI products,
192. W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1401, 1411-17 (2016).
193. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 81-83
(2020) [hereinafter Price, Contextual Bias]; see also VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 8
("When information is sticky, innovators tend to rely largely on information they already have in
stock."). At the margins, these incentives may exacerbate existing pressures in favor of hospital merger
and acquisition activity.
194. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Veterans Aff. Official Involved in Informatics (June
25, 2020).
195. See, e.g., Announcement ofRequirements and Registration for "Artificial Intelligence Health
Outcomes Challenge", CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 13, 2020),
https ://innovation .ems. govIF iIes/xiaichal Ienge-pubnotice. pdf
[https ://perma. cc/9 RHY -TF9V);
BlueCross BlueShield Data Innovation Challenge, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS 'N, (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.bcbs.com/bluecross-blueshield-data-innovation-challenge
[https://perma.cc/ZA8DY ANY).
196. Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Artificial Intelligence Could Revolutionize Medical Care. But
Don't
Trust
It
to
Read
Your
X-ray
Just
Yet,
SCI.
(Jun.
17,
2019),
https ://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/arti ficial-intel Ii gence-could-revo luti onize-medical-caredon-t-trust-i t-read-your-x-ra y.
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but insufficient data to weed out possible bias or performance issues.
Moreover, the ability of some powerful actors within the health system to
develop in-house products based solely on their own data may reduce the
impetus for broader data-sharing efforts, including the creation of largescale centralized datasets that multiple institutions could use. 197 The
competitive value of data as a resource for AI product development may
further encourage the trend of data-hoarding, slowing the development of
better tools trained on larger aggregations of shared data.
To be sure, some problems may truly demand localized solutions, as the
user innovation literature points out; perhaps the factors that drive C. diff.
infection in one hospital are fundamentally different from those that drive
infection in another. 198 But perhaps not. At a minimum, it would be worth
probing why such a biological result seems so context-dependent-a project
that would surely benefit from interrogating a broader dataset assembled
from multiple institutions. 199 For other products, like a staffing prediction
or patient-flow model, context specificity seems likely to be typical. It might
nonetheless seem problematic that smaller entities may have smaller
datasets for their own context and are therefore at higher risk of developing
erroneous AI systems.
If the availability of data is a major hurdle, we should also expect to see
substantial discrepancies among health entities in their ability to develop
their own AI systems at all. Small community health systems, for instance,
are much less likely to have the data capacity ( or, for that matter, the
information-technology capacity) to develop their own algorithms. To the
extent that self-developed AI systems adapted to a particular system become
important for providing high-quality health care, for interacting with
insurers or other systems, or for maintaining a competitive level of
efficiency, smaller systems will be especially disadvantaged. If smaller
systems react by attempting to adopt AI products developed in larger
systems, systematic quality or bias problems may occur as a result of
197. Governmental efforts like the All of US cohort are an attempt to fill the gap. See Joshua C.
Denny et al., The "All of Us" Research Program, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 668,668 (2019). Theoretically,
large-scale organizations could self-organize to promote data-sharing, but there are structural barriers to
such efforts, including HIPAA and other privacy protections. See W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and
Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 65 (2017) [hereinafter Price, Risk and
Resilience]. If large organizations can make substantial progress using only their own data-even if this
progress falls short of what consolidated datasets might permit-they face lower incentives to try to
overcome those barriers.
198. Cf Jenna Wiens, John Guttag & Eric Horvitz, A Study in Transfer Learning: Leveraging
Data from Multiple Hospitals to Enhance Hospital-Specific Predictions, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS'N 699,699 (2014) (finding better performance of C. dijf. infections when a model was trained on
data from multiple hospitals).
199. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity Through Machine Learning, 106
IOWA L. REV. 775 (2021).
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differences in patient populations and care patterns, as described in Section
IV.C below. 200
On the other hand, the user innovation literature teaches that in many
contexts innovations initially developed by lead users at the forefront of
their field to meet their own needs can provide prototypes that point seller
innovators towards opportunities to create more standardized versions to
supply a larger market of users. 201 When large academic medical centers
innovate successfully, smaller providers will not necessarily try to rely on
their own much smaller datasets to compete, but may instead look to seller
innovators to provide better commercial AI products. We see evidence that
commercial sellers are already filling that role for some of the innovations
we consider here, including the commercial firm Pieces, which developed
the "Pieces Predict" commercial product based on a thirty-day readmission
model developed at UT Southwestem. 202 Other institutions with large
datasets, such as the VA, are collaborating with commercial developers
from the start to use their data to develop new AI products rather than
hoarding their data exclusively for user innovation. 203
Policy makers could further support the development or licensing of
high-quality AI tools for smaller health systems or community settings in a
number of ways to ensure equitable access to quality care. CMS, with its
increasing focus on rural health care, 204 might work with NIH to establish
prize funds for the development of AI tools applicable to these settings.
These agencies might consider whether data from multiple similarly
situated facilities could be pooled to accomplish these goals, with pooling
decisions dependent on metrics of interest for the relevant AI tool. Some,
including one of us, have called for broad disclosure of privately held data
and algorithmic development information with the goal of creating public
goods for the sake of wider innovation. 205 Notably, such disclosure
mandates would be in some tension with the idea of lead users developing
their own proprietary, cutting-edge solutions for the purpose of competitive
advantage. On the commercial side, regulators might support efforts
encouraging larger systems that develop successful products for their own
use to license them to commercial firms to test and refine them further for
more widespread use by smaller systems. To the extent that the federal
See Price, Contextual Bias, supra note 193, at 90-98.
VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 133-46.
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194.
See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RURAL-URBAN DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE IN MEDICARE (Nov. 2020).
205. See, e.g., Price & Rai, supra note 199, at 801--09 (describing mandated disclosure mediated
by (surprise!) the levers of patent law, FDA regulation, and insurer reimbursement).
200.
20 I.
202.
203.
204.
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government itself is the repository for a significant amount of this data
(including through the VA), federal policymakers might be encouraged to
play this role themselves.

B. Customized Products
As user innovators, health systems and insurers are likely to develop
different products for different needs than firms developing biomedical
innovations for sale to others. Most obviously, as the user innovation
literature suggests, user innovators (whether health systems, insurers, or
some other type of entity) will tend to develop products that are closely
suited to their own particular needs. 206
AI may be especially useful for such customized solutions. Where data
formats, care patterns, and health problems are specific to a particular
context, as the fragmented nature of U.S. health care suggests will be
common, 207 AI products developed by users may be an effective solution
that would be foreclosed if development costs and legal hurdles were higher.
Thus, health systems can develop products to model and predict patient flow
that are particularly responsive to their own patient dynamics. 208 Duke's
Sepsis Watch AI tool illustrates the importance of user-developed
contextual knowledge to technical AI success. This app, developed by a
team at Duke University, uses machine learning to determine a patient's risk
of developing sepsis; however, in order for Sepsis Watch to work,
successful implementation has required disruption to the ordinary workflow
in the emergency department; Duke ER nurses, assigned as primary users
of the app, needed to reverse the typical ER chain of command to alert ER
physicians of the app's findings. This kind of disruption may have doomed
another AI product, but Duke's Sepsis Watch tool has been very successful
at significantly reducing sepsis-induced patient deaths at Duke Health. This
206. VON RIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 8 ("One consequence of the information
asymmetry between users and manufacturers is that users tend to develop innovations that are
functionally novel, requiring a great deal of user-need information and use-context information for their
development. In contrast, manufacturers tend to develop innovations that are improvements on wellknown needs and that require a rich understanding of solution information for their development.").
207. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG, SHANNON BROWNLEE, ELLIOT S. FISHER, JONATHAN S.
SKINNER & JAMES N. WEINSTEIN, DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL'Y & CLINICAL PRAC., AN
AGENDA FOR CHANGE: IMPROVING QUALITY AND CURBING HEALTH CARE SPENDING: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
THE
CONGRESS
AND
THE
OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
(2008),
https://data.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/agenda_for_change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GEPT5H4] (describing practice variations and pattern changes); OFF. NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH
INFO. TECH., CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO ACHIEVE AN
INTEROPERABLE
HEALTH
IT
INFRASTRUCTURE
(2014),
http://www. health it.gov/sites/default/tiles/ON C I 0yearInteropera bi Ii tyConceptPaper. p df
[https://perma.cc/LSN8-XRQB] (describing interoperability and data fragmentation challenges).
208. Thompson, supra note 42.
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success is at least partially due to the fact that Sepsis Watch was created for
the specific context of the Duke emergency department. Madeleine Eilish,
a member of the Duke team evaluating the implementation of Sepsis Watch
at Duke, cited the context-specific user development of Sepsis Watch as one
of the keys to the app's success, noting that "the tool was adapted for a
hyper-local, hyper-specific context: it was developed for the emergency
department at Duke Health and nowhere else."209
Some might question whether it makes sense as a matter of regulatory
policy to encourage such narrowly targeted innovative efforts. 210 Innovators
engage in efforts based on the data that they have, the incentives they face
in their own contexts, and the particular problems that seem most pressing
to them. Sometimes this can reflect useful customization to genuinely local
problems, as the user innovation literature suggests. 211 Where local
innovation is siloed both by the presence of the data and the contextually
local nature of the problem, it may decrease the opportunities for learning
from others-a problem that may be especially aggravated if privacy laws
make it more difficult to share data with other institutions. 212 Although some
user innovators freely reveal their innovations, they may have little
incentive to invest significant resources in diffusion of their innovations to
others. 213 On the other hand, academic medical centers may be more likely
than other user innovators both to publish their innovations and to license
them to commercial firms.
Often the lead users who innovate to address their own idiosyncratic

209. Karen Hao, How an AI Tool for Fighting Hospital Deaths Actually Worked in the Real World,
MIT TECH. REV. (October 2, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/02/1009267/aireduced-hospital-deaths-in-the-real-world/ [https://perrna.cc/954Q-35BS].
210. In a highly stylized account of how patents promote innovation, the patent system
theoretically directs innovators to make the most socially beneficial innovations by linking rewards to
the market value of patented goods~but as we have discussed, the incentives from the patent system
appear to be less salient in this context. In addition, a substantial literature catalogs the limits of the
ability of patents to drive socially beneficial innovation. E.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The
Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); Sachs, Prizing
Insurance, supra note IO; Amy Kapczynski, The Cost ofPrice: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012), W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120
COLUM. L. REV. 769 (2020). Additionally, to the extent that Al tools may help reduce costs (even if not
increasing quality irrespective of costs), there is still significant social value in their development.
Currently, there are relatively few legal incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations, but the
combination of policy tools in the AI space might encourage their development here.
211. VON HiPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 7, at 33-44.
212. See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and Protecting Patient
Privacy, 322 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1141, 1141-42 (2019).
213. For a review of the literature, see NIKOLAUS FRANKE & CHRISTIAN LOTHJE, USER
INNOVATION I 0-13 (Jan. 2020), https://www.wu.ac.at/fileadmin/wu/d/i/entrep/4_ forschung/full-textpapers/franke_luethje_ 2020_ User_innovation.pd[ [https://perrna.cc/S6DF-T6YT].
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needs are harbingers of future trends. 214 It may be difficult to tell at the point
of innovation whether an academic medical center is addressing a purely
local problem, or whether they are ahead of the field in recognizing and
addressing a problem that others will also recognize and want to address
down the road. Von Hippel and Torrance use the term "innovation
wetlands" to highlight both the value of user innovation and its vulnerability
to policy choices focused on short-term assessments. 215
Where context is not particularly important, the advantage of user
innovation over seller innovation may be smaller, although lead users may
still have an important role to play in pointing out emerging needs. Problems
that are especially pressing for one academic medical center may reflect
systematic problems that are best tackled at a broader level, rather than
having individual institutions each devoting limited innovation resources to
addressing the same problems locally. For instance, although there is some
user innovation related to billing,216 examples are not plentiful. On the other
hand, there are already several commercial products available that use AI
for billing optimization, suggesting that context specificity may be less
important for this type of product and it can more readily be developed by
outsiders for sale to a broader market. The commercially developed 3M 360
Encompass System, 217 for example, scans medical records to identify
services that were provided to a patient, suggesting which codes can be
billed to insurers. 218 On the insurer side, Kirontech touts the use of
unsupervised machine learning and natural language processing to validate
claims and to detect fraudulent health insurance claims in real time. 219
Since commercial incentives are greater for seller innovators to address
less contextual problems, policymakers might consider how best to help
user innovators address more contextual problems-though as we have
highlighted, much such innovation is already taking place. Policy support
for user innovation might focus on grants for data infrastructure, best
practices for AI development and validation, or training data scientists to

214. See Eric von Hippe!, Lead Users: A Source ofNovel Product Concepts, 32 MGMT. SCI. 791805 (1986).
215. Torrance & von Hippe!, supra note 84, at 45-74.
216. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
217. Real-Time Clinical Insights for Physicians and CDI Teams, 3M (2019),
https://www.3m.com/3 Ml en_ US/health-in forrnati on-systems-us/providers/clinical-documentation/cdiengage-one/.
218. Real Results: A Profile of Eight Organizations Boosted by the 3M'"M 360 Encompass™
System, 3M HEALTH INFO. SYS. (2019), https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/9554100/3m-360encompass-real-results-8-profiles.pdf
219. Medical
Payment
Integrity,
KlRONTECH,
https://www.kirontech.com/
[https://perma.cc/T6QG-PDZW].
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create contextual AI solutions. 220
C. Decreased Quality Oversight

Medical AI innovations are likely to be implemented with less
independent quality oversight relative to other medical devices, including
commercially developed point-of-care AI. As described above in Sections
III.A and III.C, quality oversight for some new health technologies comes
from FDA regulation and insurance coverage determinations, both of which
provide some assessment of quality for new products. These two players
have a smaller role in assessing many of the products we describe here,
leading to less oversight for safety and effectiveness. Thus, many algorithms
that may have an impact on patient care receive less external vetting before
they are implemented, and may thus cause harm because of undiscovered
error.221
We need not look far to see how such error might occur. 222 One team at
Mount Sinai developed an AI algorithm to identify pneumonia based on
patient chest x-ray images. 223 The algorithm was trained on Mount Sinai
data, where many chest x-rays came from patients with pneumonia, and
detected pneumonia 93% of the time. 224 When the algorithm was tested on
images from the NIH and the Indiana Network for Patient care, performance
dropped sharply. One reason was that the rates of pneumonia at those sites
were lower, and the patient populations were different. Another reason was
that the algorithm had learned to predict outcomes based on whether the
image came from a portable x-ray machine or a fixed machine-and the
latter is typically used on sicker patients. 225
Had this algorithm been developed and deployed for clinical care, such
a performance pattern would be highly problematic. The algorithm might
appear to function decently at Mount Sinai, since it would be relying on the
220. Price II, supra note 54; see also Bridge to Artificial Intelligence (Bridge2Al), NTH,
https://commonfund.nih.gov/bridge2ai [https://perma.cc/QA6Q-FTLE] (announcing a grant program to
develop datasets, software and standards, best practices, and training materials for medical AI
development).
221. To be sure, algorithms that have the highest impact on patient care are those FDA is most
likely to regulate, and even if software does not normally fall within the definition of a medical device
under the Cures Act, FDA can determine that the software needs to be regulated anyway. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(o)(3)(A).
222. See Couzin-Frankel, supra note 196.
223. John R. Zech et al., Variable Generalization Performance of a Deep learning Model to
Detect Pneumonia in Chest Radiographs: A Cross-Sectional Study, PLOS MED. 3 (Nov. 6, 2018)
https://joumals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id= I 0.1371/joumal.pmed.1002683
[https://perma.cc/Z745-SEZK].
224. Id. at 11.
225. Id. at 13.
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same provider-created information (e.g., the use of portable x-rays) that it
was trained on-but it would not provide as much useful information as the
hospital thought, and its performance would degrade over time as care
patterns shifted. If, for instance; the hospital shifted to using portable x-ray
machines more broadly, the algorithm, relying on an unreliable proxy
signal, would suggest that many more people had pneumonia. An even
worse situation would arise if the algorithm were deployed at other sites,
such as the Indiana network, without further testing; performance would be
substantially worse, but provider-users could easily be none the wiser. In
this case, testing by the developers to evaluate performance in different
contexts provided the type of quality oversight we might hope for, perhaps
demonstrating independent evaluation of the sort that FDA is emphasizing
in its recent thinking about regulating medical AI. 226 Unfortunately, the vast
majority of AI image analysis algorithms are tested at only one hospital,
making it all too likely that innovators will fail to notice such problematic
development patterns on their own. 227
The failure of some AI systems will be obvious to users-readmissions
might increase rather than decrease-but others may go undetected. Health
outcomes are notoriously difficult to attribute to a particular intervention,
which is why health technology is described as a credence good and why
formal regulatory oversight is justified. 228 For other problematic outcomes,
the results may be observable but not actually observed; if hospital
algorithms result in patients suffering ills that they self-treat with over-thecounter medications (being discharged too early, for instance), those
problems might never come to the attention of the innovator. 229
Most perniciously, biased results-prioritizing wealthy or white
patients, for instance-might well accord with a hospital's bottom-line
incentives of efficiency and revenue maximization, even if they are socially
and morally repugnant and might otherwise be detected and blocked by a
regulator. This sort of problem, too, has already occurred on a substantial
scale.
226.
227.

See supra text at notes 120-122.

Dong Wook Kim, Hye Young Jang, Kyung Won Kim, Youngbin Shin & Seong Ho Park,
Design Characteristics of Studies Reporting the Performance of Artificial Intelligence Algorithms for
Diagnostic Analysis of Medical Images: Results from Recently Published Papers, 20 KOREAN J.
RADIOLOGY 405, 405 (2019) (finding that only 6% of 516 published studies for medical AI image
analysis included external validation).
228. Price, supra note 3, at 433.
229. The health system as a whole is generally poor at monitoring holistic patient outcomes and
learning from them. The idea of a learning health system aims to fix this problem. See DIGITAL
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 2-3 (Claudia Grossman, Brian Powers & J.
Michael McGinnis eds., 2011); Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1163, 1164-69
(2014).
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As Ziad Obermeyer and colleagues documented, Optum, a unit of the
large insurer UnitedHealth Group, developed an AI system in-house to
predict which patients were likely to have medical complications, with the
aim of providing outpatient guidance services to particularly high-risk
patients. 230 This system was developed, validated, and deployed in due
course, and influenced the care received by many patients. But, as
Obermeyer's team found, the algorithm was not at all neutral. The
developers used a reasonable proxy for complexity of patient care: how
much was spent on the patient's care. But they did not account for the fact
that Black patients and other minority patients receive substantially less
care, and consequently cost less, for reasons of systemic bias or resource
constraints rather than because of medical differences. Accordingly, the
algorithm predicted white patients were at substantially higher risk than
Black patients with the same ailments, with the result that white patients
received more outpatient coordination services. The bias went unnoticed by
the developers, presumably because the outcomes aligned reasonably with
the algorithm's goals of reducing costly complications, as measured by later
costs. Eventually, oversight by academic researchers caught the problem, at
least in this instance, and Optum agreed to work with Obermeyer's team to
fix the problem going forward. 231 But this sort of bias could readily arise in
unregulated use of medical AI.
We do not mean to overstate the point about lessened oversight from key
players. In particular, FDA retains the authority to regulate software as a
medical device, even if the software initially falls into one of the Cures Act's
exclusions. 232 But policymakers should consider what role other players
might have here as well. Learned societies could play some part in
determining the quality of medical AI within their respective bailiwicks,
offering views as to when these products should and should not be used.
The American College of Radiologists, for instance, could evaluate medical
AI that evaluates radiological images, though homegrown products might
fly under the radar oflearned societies as well. 233 Another possibility would
be to establish a system of oversight with a lighter touch, more analogous
to the one used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in their
230. Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting Racial
Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 447 (2019); Heidi
Ledford, Millions of Black People Affected by Racial Bias in Health-Care Algorithms, NATURE (Oct.
24, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d4l586-019-03228-6 [https://perma.cc/WX78-6RZD)
(identifying the developer as Optum).
231. Ledford, supra note 230, at 608.
232. See supra note IOI and accompanying text.
233. And the group might also have a vested interest against giving these products an
endorsement.
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administration of the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
program (CLIA). 234 Although FDA may be exercising its enforcement
discretion to relieve LDTs of the full burden of device regulation under the
FDCA, those laboratories still receive a form of regulation through CLIA,
and laboratories must obtain CLIA certification if they wish to receive
reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid more generally. 235 Indeed,
FDA and other regulators may ultimately design such a mechanism in the
course of ongoing efforts to adapt device regulation to software as a medical
device. 236 Hospital accreditation mechanisms are another potential source
of oversight, with accreditation being required by states and the federal
government as a condition of continued operation and reimbursement.
CONCLUSION

The development of Al tools and the widespread adoption of electronic
health records have fostered user innovation in medical AI in a legal
landscape that looks different from that applied to more familiar forms of
biomedical innovation to develop new drugs and traditional devices. Patents
are less certain and less powerful; FDA remains important but lurks in the
background rather than looming over product entry, and insurance
reimbursement provides fewer direct incentives and less quality oversight.
And yet these products offer great prospects for improving patient care,
whether they are predicting risky outcomes, monitoring vital signs,
managing patient flow, or allocating resources. There is a world of medical
Al innovation occurring inside health systems and insurers that differs from
commercial product development in important ways. We do not suggest that
we have fully characterized this world, or that we know how to solve the
problems that may arise. Policy interventions in this space are choices, and
there is likely no optimum, but it is important to be alert to the innovation
landscape while making policy choices. Although policy interventions that
are powerful with respect to seller innovation, whether patents, regulation,
or reimbursement, are less powerful for user innovation, that does not imply
that the incentives need to be changed to mimic their effects elsewhere;
other tools may be better suited to shape the challenges we observe, or to
nurture the positive trends. Nor is the world of user innovation in this space
fully separate from the world of seller innovation; products that start their
life as user innovation in a single health system may well be spun out into
234. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA [https://perma.cc/T5G7VJ6B].
23 5. See id.; see also supra note 115.
236. See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
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startup companies or acquired by ex1stmg manufacturers, making the
transition from user innovation to a more classic commercialization model,
where different legal regimes and incentives apply. Nevertheless, the space
of user innovation in medical AI is worth further examination. We have
aimed here to point out its major features, to indicate its importance, and to
raise the call for future study.

